479 U.S. 564 (1987)
In February 1979, respondent John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado.1
Shortly thereafter, an informant told agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that Spring was engaged in the interstate transportation of stolen firearms.2 The informant also told the agents that Spring had discussed his participation in the Colorado killing.3
On March 30, 1979, ATF agents arrested Spring in Kansas City, Missouri, during the undercover purchase.4 An ATF agent on the scene of the arrest advised Spring of his Miranda rights.5 Spring was advised of his Miranda rights a second time after he was transported to the ATF office in Kansas City.6 At the ATF office, the agents also advised Spring that he had the right to stop the questioning at any time or to stop the questioning until the presence of an attorney could be secured.7 Spring then signed a written form stating that he understood and waived his rights, and that he was willing to make a statement and answer questions.8
ATF agents first questioned Spring about the firearms transactions that led to his arrest.9 They then asked Spring if he had a criminal record.10 He admitted that he had a juvenile record for shooting his aunt when he was 10 years old.11 The agents asked if Spring had ever shot anyone else.12 Spring ducked his head and mumbled, “I shot another guy once.”13 The agents asked Spring if he had ever been to Colorado.14 Spring said no.15 The agents asked Spring whether he had shot a man named Walker in Colorado and thrown his body into a snowbank.16 Spring paused and then ducked his head again and said no.17 The interview ended at this point.18
On May 26, 1979, Colorado law enforcement officials visited Spring while he was in jail in Kansas City pursuant to his arrest on the firearms offenses.19 The officers gave Spring the Miranda warnings, and Spring again signed a written form indicating that he understood his rights and was willing to waive them.20 The officers informed Spring that they wanted to question him about the Colorado homicide.21 Spring indicated that he “wanted to get it off his chest.”22 In an interview that lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours, Spring confessed to the Colorado murder.23 During that time, Spring talked freely to the officers, did not indicate a desire to terminate the questioning, and never requested counsel.24 The officers prepared a written statement summarizing the interview.25 Spring read, edited, and signed the statement.26
Spring was charged in Colorado state court with first-degree murder.27 Spring moved to suppress both statements on the ground that his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid.28 The trial court concluded that the May 26 statement was made freely, voluntarily, and intelligently, after Spring’s being properly and fully advised of his rights, and that the statement should not be suppressed, but should be admitted in evidence.29 The May 26 statement was admitted into evidence at trial, and Spring was convicted of first-degree murder.30 The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed Spring’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.31 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve an arguable Circuit conflict.33
The Court sought to review the Colorado Supreme Court’s determination that a suspect’s awareness of the possible subjects of questioning is a relevant and sometimes determinative consideration in assessing whether a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is valid.
Whether the suspect’s awareness of all the crimes about which he may be questioned is relevant to determining the validity of his decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege?34
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that a suspect's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is valid only if it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.35 A statement is not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an individual voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his constitutional privilege.36 The inquiry whether a waiver is coerced has two distinct dimensions: first the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception; second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.37 The Miranda warnings protect this privilege by ensuring that a suspect knows that he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time.38 The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.39
No. The established facts demonstrate that Spring received complete Miranda warnings on two separate occasions before the March 30 interview.40 Spring executed a written waiver form confirming his understanding of the rights to remain silent and to counsel.41 Although ATF agents did not disclose in advance that questioning would touch on the Colorado homicide, the trial court expressly found no element of duress or coercion in obtaining Spring's statements.42 Spring exhibited no misunderstanding of the basic Fifth Amendment privilege or the consequence that his statements could be used against him.43
The May 26 confession occurred only after fresh Miranda warnings plus explicit notice that officers sought to discuss the homicide.44 Spring spoke freely for ninety minutes without invoking silence or counsel.45 Because the initial waiver satisfied the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard, the later statement could not be suppressed as fruit of a poisonous tree.46
The suspect's awareness of all the crimes about which he may be questioned is not relevant to determining the validity of his decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that a suspect's knowledge of the specific crimes under investigation is relevant to the totality-of-circumstances assessment of whether a waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.48 He emphasized that the ATF agents' tactic of securing a waiver for firearms questions and then shifting without warning to an unrelated Colorado murder created an element of surprise.49 This surprise could undermine the knowing character of the waiver and exploit the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.50
Marshall concluded that the State had failed to carry its heavy burden of proving a valid waiver and would have affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court's suppression ruling.51