566 U.S. 30 (2012)
Daniel Coleman was employed by the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland as an employee.1 In 2007, Coleman requested FMLA leave from his employer to care for his own serious health condition.2 The request was denied, and Coleman was later terminated from his position.3
Coleman filed a damages action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the Maryland Court of Appeals, its administrative judge, and its personnel administrator.4 He alleged that the denial of his leave request and his termination violated the self-care provision of the FMLA.5
The District Court dismissed Coleman's suit on the basis of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the self-care provision did not validly abrogate the State's immunity from suit.7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the self-care provision of the FMLA validly abrogates the States' sovereign immunity.8
Whether the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 validly abrogates the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suits for damages?9
Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only when it both unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of power.10 To satisfy the second requirement, legislation must be congruent and proportional to the prevention or remediation of unconstitutional state conduct.11 This standard was established in City of Boerne v. Flores and applied in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs to the family-care provision of the FMLA.12
No. The self-care provision fails the congruence and proportionality test because the legislative record contains no evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional gender-based discrimination by States in the administration of self-care leave.13 Coleman requested FMLA leave to care for his own serious health condition, the request was denied, and he was terminated.14 He then sued the Maryland Court of Appeals and two officials for damages in federal district court.15 The District Court dismissed the suit on the basis that the Maryland Court of Appeals, as an entity of a sovereign State, was immune from the suit for damages.16
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, unlike the family-care provision at issue in Hibbs, the self-care provision was not directed at an identified pattern of gender-based discrimination and was not congruent and proportional to any pattern of sex-based discrimination on the part of States.17 Applying the rule to these facts shows that the self-care provision, unlike the family-care provision upheld in Hibbs, is not narrowly targeted at any identified pattern of state constitutional violations.18 The provision instead creates a substantive entitlement available equally to men and women without evidence that it remedies sex discrimination.19
The self-care provision of the FMLA does not validly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suits for damages.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan, Jj.
Justice Ginsburg dissented on the ground that the self-care provision validly enforces the Equal Protection Clause as part of the FMLA's comprehensive scheme to combat gender discrimination in the workplace.21 She emphasized that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination and that the provision prevents employers from viewing women as risks by ensuring gender-neutral leave.22 Ginsburg argued that the majority undervalued the statute's text, purpose, and history, which repeatedly reference equal protection and the need to avoid stereotypes that caring for family is women's work.23
She concluded that the self-care provision is congruent and proportional because it addresses documented patterns of discrimination against pregnant women in public employment and reduces incentives for employers to discriminate against women when hiring.24
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to reiterate his view that Hibbs was wrongly decided.25 He maintained that the family-care provision itself lacks a sufficient link to a demonstrated pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States.26 Thomas stated that the self-care provision at issue here is even further removed from any such pattern of constitutional violations.27
He joined the plurality opinion only to the extent it held that Congress did not validly abrogate state immunity for the self-care provision, while continuing to disagree with the broader framework applied to family-care leave.28
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on the distinct ground that the congruence and proportionality test should be abandoned in favor of an approach tied directly to the text of Section 5.29 He argued that, outside the context of racial discrimination, Congress's enforcement power should be limited to regulating conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Scalia concluded that a State's failure to grant self-care leave does not come close to violating the Amendment and therefore cannot be reached by prophylactic legislation.31
He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals without engaging in the legislative record review required by the prevailing test.32
Whether Congress acted within its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the self-care provision of the FMLA?33
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Amendment by appropriate legislation.34 Any such legislation must be congruent and proportional to identified constitutional violations by the States.35 Prophylactic measures that reach beyond actual violations are permissible only when supported by a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct and a remedy narrowly tailored to that pattern.36
No. The self-care provision is not a valid exercise of Section 5 authority because Congress identified no pattern of state constitutional violations in the administration of self-care leave.37 Coleman was denied leave for his own serious health condition and terminated.38 He then sued state entities for damages.39 The District Court and Fourth Circuit dismissed the suit on immunity grounds.40
The legislative record shows concern for economic burdens of illness and discrimination on the basis of illness rather than sex.41 When applied to these facts, the provision does not remedy or prevent gender-based discrimination of the sort addressed in Hibbs.42 Instead it regulates neutral policies that may have a disparate impact on women, which is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation under the rule.43
Congress did not act within its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the self-care provision of the FMLA.44
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, And Kagan, Jj.
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the self-care provision is valid Section 5 legislation because it responds to pervasive discrimination against pregnant women in public employment.45 She detailed congressional findings of women being fired after childbirth and evidence that existing sick-leave policies were inadequate.46 Ginsburg argued that the provision's gender-neutral design prevents the very discrimination that would arise from pregnancy-only mandates and is therefore congruent and proportional to the identified constitutional violations.47
She further explained that the self-care provision is inseparable from the family-care provisions.48 Mandating only family-care leave would encourage employers to discriminate against women of childbearing age.49 The gender-neutral medical leave counters that incentive by showing that men and women take medical leave at equal rates.50
Whether the self-care provision of the FMLA is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause?51
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.52 A statute regulating purely intrastate activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce exceeds this power.53 This principle was set forth in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.54
No. The self-care provision regulates intrastate employment relationships that do not substantially affect interstate commerce.55 Coleman sought leave from his state employer for his own medical condition and sued when the request was denied.56 The District Court dismissed on immunity grounds and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.57 The provision does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.58
Nor does it target persons or things in interstate commerce.59 Applied to these facts, the self-care entitlement is a regulation of local employment conditions lacking the required substantial effect on interstate commerce.60
The self-care provision of the FMLA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.61