418 U.S. 506 (1974)
In December 1966, petitioners Dominick Codispoti and Herbert Langnes were codefendants with Richard Mayberry in a criminal trial that ended in a guilty verdict.1 Each petitioner acted as his own counsel while legal advice remained available from appointed counsel.2 At the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge found Mayberry guilty of eleven separate contempts committed during the proceedings and imposed sentences of one to two years for each.3 The same judge found Codispoti guilty of seven separate contempts and Langnes guilty of six separate contempts, imposing identical one-to-two-year sentences for each finding.4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the contempt convictions.5 The United States Supreme Court granted Mayberry's petition for certiorari and vacated the judgment, directing that another judge not bearing the sting of the remarks sit in judgment on remand.6 The contempt charges against Mayberry and the two petitioners were then retried in separate proceedings before a different trial judge.7
Codispoti demanded a jury trial, which the court denied.8 He also moved to subpoena witnesses to prove that his actions did not disrupt the proceedings and were not contemptuous but merely responses to provocation by the presiding judge; that motion was denied.9 The State introduced into evidence portions of the 1966 trial transcript containing the alleged contempts and then rested.10 Codispoti neither testified nor called any witnesses.11
The trial court found Codispoti guilty of the seven charged contempts and sentenced him to six months in prison for each of six contempts and three months for the seventh, all sentences to run consecutively.12 Langnes's trial followed a similar course; he was found guilty of six separate contempts and sentenced to five terms of six months each and one term of two months, all to be served consecutively.13
The trial court filed an opinion stating that the only points at issue were the validity of the sentences.14 The court noted that the question of guilt had already been confirmed by both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.15 The court also held that petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial because no term of imprisonment in excess of six months was imposed for any one offense.16 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.17 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the questions raising whether petitioners should have been afforded a jury trial.18
Whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial on multiple contempt charges arising from a single criminal trial when the sentences imposed for each charge were six months or less but were ordered to run consecutively so that the aggregate term exceeded six months?19
Criminal contempts tried in a single post-trial proceeding before one judge are serious offenses requiring a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the sentences, though individually six months or less, are ordered to run consecutively and thereby aggregate to more than six months.20 The aggregation in one proceeding, rather than the individual sentences, determines seriousness because guilt on each charge bears directly on the ultimate term and creates the risk of arbitrary action the jury trial right was designed to prevent.21
Yes. The established facts show that after the original 1966 trial in which petitioners acted as their own counsel, a different judge on retrial denied Codispoti's jury demand.22 The judge found him guilty of seven contempts charged in a single proceeding.23 The judge imposed six-month terms for six contempts plus three months for the seventh, all consecutive for a total of three years and three months.24 Langnes received five consecutive six-month terms and one two-month term for six contempts, totaling two years and eight months.25 Under the rule from Bloom v. Illinois and Duncan v. Louisiana, as applied here, the aggregation of sentences in one proceeding makes each contemnor's case equivalent to a serious offense.26 The denial of a jury trial violated the Constitution.27
The court reasoned that when punishment is postponed until after trial there is no overriding necessity for instant action to preserve order.28 The trial judge alone determines which acts the citations will cover and whether sentences run consecutively.29 This single-proceeding structure poses the very likelihood of arbitrary action that the jury-trial guarantee was intended to avoid.30 Because the contempts arose from a single trial, were charged by a single judge, and were tried and sentenced in one proceeding with consecutive terms, the petitioners were tried for what was equivalent to a serious offense.31
The trial court's contrary view that no single sentence exceeded six months therefore treated each contempt as petty was rejected.32 The salient fact remains that the sentences were aggregated in one proceeding so that the total punishment was several times more than six months.33
Petitioners were entitled to jury trials on the contempt charges.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment and in Parts I and III of the opinion but could not join Part II.35 He argued that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial would be equally applicable even if the judge imposed summary punishment during trial for each allegedly contemptuous act as it occurred.36 In his view, where the contemptuous acts arose out of a single course of conduct by the defendant, they should be treated as a single serious offense for which the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial, whether the judge seeks to use his summary contempt power in individual instances during trial or tries the contempts together at the end of trial.37
He noted that the same likelihood of arbitrary action by a judge exists when he acts summarily during trial rather than awaiting the end of trial.38 The suggestion of summary punishment provides an incentive for a trial judge to act in the heat of the moment, encouraging the very arbitrary action the Sixth Amendment is meant to eliminate.39 Justice Marshall further explained that the availability of other remedies set forth in Illinois v. Allen, such as binding and gagging the defendant or removing him from the courtroom, provides persuasive proof that courtroom disorder can be dealt with effectively without repeated summary contempt citations resulting in lengthy jail terms.40
Joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, And Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Justice Blackmun dissented from the extension of Bloom to direct, in-court contempts.41 He noted that in Bloom the contempt was outside the presence of the court, making it logical to require a jury, but here the contempt took place in open court and the incident and all its details are fully preserved on the trial record.42 He expressed being at a loss to see the role a jury is to perform since the facts are undisputed.43
Justice Blackmun stated that the perceived need to remove the case from the contemned judge is fully served by assigning the case to a different judge.44 Since the new judge, not the jury, will impose the sentence, there is nothing the jury can do by way of mitigating an excessive punishment.45 He concluded that the determination of whether basically undisputed facts constitute a direct criminal contempt is a particularly inappropriate task for the jury, and he would not join the Court's extension of Bloom to include direct, in-court contempts.46
Joined by The Chief Justice As To Part Ii
Justice Rehnquist dissented.47 He argued that these cases illustrate how constitutional limitations on the power of a trial judge to summarily punish for contempt have been fashioned virtually out of whole cloth by the Court in only twenty-odd years.48 He contended that the decisions are the culmination of a recent trend of constitutional innovation which virtually emasculates the historic power of a trial judge.49 The only consistent thread is the Court's inveterate propensity to second-guess the trial judge.50
Regarding Codispoti specifically, he argued that the Court does not sufficiently distinguish the analogous case of Jenkins v. Delaware, which suggests that petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial upon their retrial for contempt because their original trial began prior to Duncan and Bloom.51 He also questioned the application of the six-month rule to consecutive sentences on counts of six months or less, noting that the jury cannot limit the sentence imposed by the judge and that the result would be different in other fact situations, such as summary punishment during trial.52 Justice Rehnquist concluded that he dissents from the Court's reversal of the convictions in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania.53
Whether the prior affirmance of petitioners' contempt convictions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court in a related proceeding eliminated any need for a jury trial on retrial before a different judge?54
No. The trial court erred when it held that the question of guilt had already been confirmed by both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court and therefore no jury was required.57 The Supreme Court in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania vacated the judgment affirming the convictions.58 It directed a new trial before another judge who would sit in judgment on the conduct shown by the record.59 It did not affirm the convictions.60
Because the prior proceeding did not adjudicate guilt for purposes of the retrial, petitioners remained entitled to a jury trial on the question of their guilt or innocence.61
The prior affirmance did not eliminate the need for a jury trial on retrial.62