610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980)
The City of Santa Barbara brought suit against appellant Adamson and other residents of a house she owns in a single-family residential zone.1 The city sought to enforce its zoning ordinance requiring that occupants of houses in such zones be members of a "family" as defined in section 28.04.230 of the ordinance.2 That definition includes an individual or related persons living as a single housekeeping unit, or a group of not more than five unrelated persons excluding servants.3
Appellants consist of three named residents who are part of a group of twelve adults living together in the house.4 The occupants, in their late twenties or early thirties and including professionals such as a lawyer and a graduate student, are not related by blood, marriage, or adoption.5 They moved into the twenty-four room house on December 1, 1977, after Adamson acquired the property.6
On February 9, 1978, following warnings, the city attorney filed suit seeking injunctive relief.7 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on March 7, 1978, and a preliminary injunction on March 29, 1978, ordering the appellants to comply with the ordinance's family definition.8
The house has 6,231 square feet, ten bedrooms, six bathrooms, and off-street parking for at least twelve cars.9 The group shares expenses, rotates chores, and eats evening meals together.10 Some members have contributed funds to house improvements and the lawsuit.11
The trial court concluded that the appellants could not reside in the zone because their group exceeded five unrelated persons.12
Whether the Santa Barbara zoning ordinance's definition of family, which limits unrelated persons living together as a single housekeeping unit to five, violates the California Constitution's guarantees of privacy, liberty, property, happiness, and privacy?13
Under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution, all people have inalienable rights including enjoying life and liberty, possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and privacy.14 The right of privacy protects the freedom to associate with the people one chooses.15 Any incursion must be justified by a compelling public interest rather than merely a rational basis.16
Yes. The ordinance limits only unrelated residents while permitting unlimited related persons or servants, failing to substantially advance goals of density control, residential character, or family environment.17 Less restrictive alternatives such as floor-space limits or traffic regulations exist.18 The distinction invades the privacy right of the twelve unrelated adults who formed a close group sharing expenses and living as a single housekeeping unit in Adamson's house.19
The ordinance violates the appellants' rights under the California Constitution.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Clark, J., And Richardson, J.
Justice Manuel dissented on the ground that the ordinances do not preclude communal living arrangements but merely impose a numerical limit of five unrelated persons.21 He argued that the privacy guarantee in article I section 1 does not confer fundamental status on a right to live with an unlimited number of unrelated persons.22 He relied on federal precedents such as Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas that apply rational-basis review to such zoning measures.23
Those precedents uphold numerical limits as rationally related to preserving family values and quiet seclusion in residential zones.24
Whether the appellants must exhaust administrative remedies by applying for a conditional use permit or variance before obtaining judicial review of the ordinance's constitutionality?25
When a constitutional attack on a zoning ordinance is meritorious, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies such as seeking a conditional use permit or variance, particularly where the procedures vest broad discretion in officials and the challenge attacks the validity of the ordinance itself rather than its application to a specific site.26
No. The constitutional claim succeeds on the merits because the ordinance's distinction between related and unrelated persons lacks a substantial relation to legitimate zoning objectives and invades the privacy right protected by the state constitution.27 Requiring exhaustion would force appellants to navigate discretionary permit processes that cannot cure the facial invalidity of the family definition.28
The appellants need not exhaust administrative remedies before obtaining judicial review.29