453 U.S. 247 (1981)
In 1975, Fact Concerts, Inc., a Rhode Island corporation organized to promote musical concerts, received permission from the Rhode Island Department of Natural Resources to present summer concerts at Fort Adams, a state park in the city of Newport.1
Fact Concerts obtained an entertainment license from the city of Newport for concerts scheduled for August 30 and 31.2 Under the contract, Fact Concerts retained control over performers while the city reserved the right to cancel if public safety demanded.3
Fact Concerts hired Blood, Sweat and Tears as a replacement performer.4 Members of the Newport City Council, including the Mayor, expressed concern that the group was a rock band rather than jazz and would attract an undesirable audience.5 The Council attempted to remove the group from the program.6
The Council then voted to cancel the contract because respondent had not lived up to all phases of the agreement.7 The Council offered respondent a new contract for the same dates, specifically excluding Blood, Sweat and Tears.8 Fact Concerts obtained a state court restraining order enjoining interference, and the concerts proceeded without incident but with fewer than half the tickets sold.9
Fact Concerts then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the city, its Mayor, and Council members.10 The complaint alleged violations of constitutional rights to free expression and due process under color of state law.11 It sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as pendent state-law claims for tortious interference with contractual relationships.
After a six-day trial, the jury returned verdicts for Fact Concerts on both counts.12 The jury awarded compensatory damages of $72,910 and punitive damages of $275,000, of which $200,000 was against the city.13
The city moved for a new trial, challenging the punitive damages award against the municipality.14 The District Court considered the issue on the merits despite the lack of objection to the jury instruction at trial.15 The court upheld the availability of punitive damages but reduced the award against the city to $75,000.16 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the punitive damages question.18
Whether a municipality may be held liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?19
By the time Congress enacted what is now § 1983, the immunity of a municipal corporation from punitive damages at common law was not open to serious question.20 Given that municipal immunity from punitive damages was well established at common law by 1871, Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.21 Finding no evidence that Congress intended to disturb the settled common-law immunity, considerations of public policy dictate the same result.22 Punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill.23
No. The jury awarded Fact Concerts, Inc. $200,000 in punitive damages against the city of Newport on the § 1983 claim after finding that the city's cancellation of the entertainment license violated constitutional rights. The common-law immunity recognized in 1871 decisions such as McGary v. President & Council of the City of Lafayette and City Council of Montgomery v. Gilmer & Taylor shielded municipalities from punitive awards.24 Nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 indicates an intent to abrogate that immunity.25 Policy considerations reinforce the rule: the city of Newport, like other municipalities, cannot harbor malice independent of its officials, so an award against the city would punish blameless taxpayers rather than the individual wrongdoers who canceled the license.26
The District Court and First Circuit had permitted the award, but the established common-law background and the compensatory and deterrent purposes of § 1983 require reversal of the punitive damages assessed against the municipality.27
A municipality may not be held liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Stevens
Justice Brennan dissented on procedural grounds.29 He contended that the petitioners' failure to object to the punitive damages instruction before the jury retired barred appellate review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51.30 Brennan maintained that the District Court expressly held the objection untimely.31
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the plain-error standard without finding manifest injustice.32 Brennan argued that the novelty of the legal issue did not create special circumstances justifying an exception to Rule 51.33 The procedural default was neither negligent nor tactical in a way that excused it.34
Allowing review here would undermine the rule's purposes of fairness and judicial efficiency in all future cases.35