349 U.S. 408 (1955)
Carroll, a Missouri resident, was employed by Hogan, also a Missouri resident, under an employment contract made in Missouri.1 Hogan acted as a subcontractor for Lanza, the general contractor on a project performed in Arkansas. Carroll sustained his injury while working on that Arkansas project.2
Carroll received 34 weekly payments for the injury under the Missouri Compensation Act.3 The Missouri Act applied to injuries received inside or outside the state when the employment contract was made in Missouri.4 It provided that every employer and employee was conclusively presumed to have elected its provisions unless prior written notice of rejection was filed with the compensation commission.5 No such notice was filed.6 The payments began automatically upon receipt of notice of the injury with no adjudication of disputes sought or obtained.7
While still receiving the Missouri payments, Carroll filed a common-law negligence action against Lanza in Arkansas state court.8 Lanza removed the case to federal district court on diversity grounds, where judgment was rendered for Carroll.9 Hogan and his indemnity company intervened and were granted a lien on the judgment for the compensation amounts already paid.10
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the Full Faith and Credit Clause barred recovery, even though it agreed the judgment was sustainable as a matter of Arkansas law.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of doubts raised by Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Commission.12
Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes Missouri’s statute a bar to Arkansas’ common-law remedy?13
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the statute of another State reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy.14 In personal injury cases the State where the injury occurs need not be a vassal to the home State and allow only that remedy which the home State has marked as the exclusive one.15
No. Carroll, a Missouri resident, entered into an employment contract in Missouri with Hogan, a Missouri subcontractor.16 Hogan was working under Lanza, the general contractor from Louisiana, on a project located in Arkansas.17 While performing work on that Arkansas project, Carroll suffered an injury.18
Upon the injury, Carroll began receiving weekly compensation payments under the Missouri Compensation Act, which applied because the contract was made in Missouri.19 He received 34 such payments, which started automatically without any formal adjudication or final award from a commission.20 The Missouri statute provided that its remedies were exclusive and excluded all other rights.21
While still receiving those payments Carroll filed a common law negligence suit against Lanza in Arkansas state court.22 Lanza removed the case to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship, and the district court entered judgment in Carroll's favor for eighteen thousand dollars.23 The court of appeals reversed, holding that full faith and credit required Arkansas to respect the exclusive remedy of Missouri.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve doubts about the applicability of prior precedents like Pacific Employers and Magnolia Petroleum.25 The established facts show no final award was obtained in Missouri and the injury occurred in Arkansas, which has its own compensation scheme that permits suits against third parties such as general contractors.26 Arkansas therefore possesses a legitimate interest in opening its courts to negligence actions arising from injuries within its borders, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel Arkansas to yield to Missouri's exclusive-remedy policy.27
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not make Missouri’s statute a bar to Arkansas’ common-law remedy.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter dissented. He argued that the forum's sole contact was the place of injury, with no Arkansas residents involved and the workman removed immediately to Missouri. He viewed the majority's approach as requiring an explicit overruling of Clapper rather than an implicit displacement of its rule that the place of injury must yield when the home state's statute is exclusive.29 Frankfurter further noted that the 1948 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 now addresses full faith and credit for statutes.30
He suggested remanding for a determination whether Missouri law would actually treat Lanza as a Missouri employer subject to its act.31 Lanza's only Missouri tie was the subcontractor's residence and the prime contract bore Louisiana letterhead.32
Whether Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt controls when an employee received weekly payments under the Missouri Compensation Act but obtained no final award or adjudication?33
No. The Court of Appeals treated the Missouri payments as equivalent to the final award that barred further recovery in Magnolia.36 Yet the Missouri Act provides that statutory payments commence automatically on receipt of notice of injury without any requirement of prior adjudication.37 Provision exists for resolving disputes between employee and employer, but no such proceeding occurred here.38 The absence of a final award distinguishes the present facts from Magnolia and leaves Arkansas free to apply its own common-law remedy against a third-party general contractor.39
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt does not control when an employee received weekly payments under the Missouri Compensation Act but obtained no final award or adjudication.40