491 U.S. 617 (1989)
In January 1985, Christopher Reckmeyer was charged in a multicount indictment with running a massive drug importation and distribution scheme as a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.1 Relying on 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), the indictment sought forfeiture of specified assets in Reckmeyer's possession.2 The District Court entered a restraining order forbidding Reckmeyer to transfer any of the listed assets that were potentially forfeitable.3
Reckmeyer had retained petitioner, a law firm, to represent him in the ongoing grand jury investigation which resulted in the January 1985 indictments.4 Notwithstanding the restraining order, Reckmeyer paid the firm $25,000 for preindictment legal services a few days after the indictment was handed down; this sum was placed by petitioner in an escrow account.5 Petitioner continued to represent Reckmeyer following the indictment.6
On March 7, 1985, Reckmeyer moved to modify the District Court's earlier restraining order to permit him to use some of the restrained assets to pay petitioner's fees and to exempt those assets from postconviction forfeiture.7 Before the District Court could conduct a hearing on this motion, Reckmeyer entered a plea agreement with the Government.8 Under the agreement, Reckmeyer pleaded guilty to the drug-related CCE charge and agreed to forfeit all of the specified assets listed in the indictment.9
Subsequently, an order forfeiting virtually all of the assets in Reckmeyer's possession was entered by the District Court in conjunction with his sentencing.10 After this order was entered, petitioner filed a petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) claiming an interest in $170,000 of Reckmeyer's assets for services it had provided in conducting his defense and seeking the $25,000 being held in the escrow account.11 The District Court granted petitioner's claim for a share of the forfeited assets.12 A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed on constitutional grounds, but the Court of Appeals en banc reversed.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the statutory and constitutional issues.14
Whether the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 authorizes forfeiture of assets a defendant contracts to transfer to an attorney to pay for legal services?15
The CFA mandates that a convicted defendant shall forfeit all property constituting or derived from proceeds of the offense.16 All right, title, and interest vests in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under the relation-back provision.17 Third parties may assert their interest and the court shall amend the order if the petitioner shows either a superior vested interest or that the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value who was reasonably without cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture at the time of the transaction.18
Yes. The established facts show that Reckmeyer transferred $25,000 and later sought to use additional restrained assets to pay petitioner after the indictment listed those assets as forfeitable and after the District Court entered a restraining order.19 Petitioner filed a § 853(n) petition claiming $170,000 plus the escrow amount but could not satisfy the bona fide purchaser standard because the indictment provided notice that the assets were subject to forfeiture.20 The en banc Fourth Circuit correctly held that the statute contains no exemption for attorney's fees and that the relation-back and third-party provisions apply directly to such transfers.21
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 authorizes forfeiture of the assets in question.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens, Jj.
Justice Blackmun argued that the Act's discretionary language in §§ 853(c) and 853(e)(1) permits courts to exempt assets needed for legitimate attorney's fees.23 He contended that the statute's central purposes of preventing future crime and stripping economic power are fully served when assets used for counsel are supervised for good faith transfers.24 A careful analysis of the language of the Act and its legislative history proves that a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the constitutional question may be avoided.25
The majority's approach writes all discretion out of §§ 853(c) and 853(e)(1) and defeats the Act's purposes by maximizing forfeiture at the expense of the right to counsel.26
Whether such forfeiture violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice?27
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to retain counsel of choice when the defendant can afford to do so.28 It does not confer a right to use another person's property or assets that have vested in the government under a valid forfeiture statute.29 The government's substantial interest in recovering the proceeds of crime and depriving offenders of economic power outweighs any limited burden on choice of counsel.30
No. The established facts demonstrate that Reckmeyer possessed only forfeitable assets derived from drug trafficking and that the government obtained both a restraining order and a post-plea forfeiture judgment covering virtually all of those assets.31 Petitioner therefore had no constitutional claim to receive payment from property that had already vested in the United States.32 The statute leaves defendants free to use untainted assets.33 Defendants may also receive appointed counsel if indigent.34
The government's interest in full forfeiture for law-enforcement funding and restitution to victims prevails over any asserted right to alienate the government's property to hire counsel.35
Forfeiture of the assets under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens, Jj.
Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that the forfeiture statute effectively strips defendants of the ability to retain private counsel.37 It does so by freezing assets before trial and by creating an intolerable conflict for any attorney who accepts payment that may later be forfeited.38 He emphasized that the right to chosen counsel fosters trust essential to effective advocacy and maintains equality between the government and the accused.39 The government's interest in pre-conviction restraint is too weak to justify the resulting damage to the adversary system.40
The long-term effect will be to decimate the private criminal-defense bar and undermine the adversarial process.41
Whether such forfeiture violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?42
The Due Process Clause requires that third parties receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before their interests in property are finally extinguished.43 The CFA satisfies this requirement by providing for post-forfeiture petitions under § 853(n) after the government has obtained a conviction and forfeiture order, together with notice through the indictment itself.44
No. The established facts establish that petitioner received notice of the potential forfeiture through the indictment.45 Petitioner filed a timely § 853(n) petition after the forfeiture order.46 The District Court initially granted relief, and the subsequent adverse en banc decision rested on statutory interpretation rather than any procedural deficiency.47
The relation-back fiction does not itself deprive petitioner of due process because petitioner had full opportunity to litigate its claim and because the statute's procedures adequately protect third-party interests.48
Forfeiture of the assets under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.49
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens, Jj.
Justice Blackmun argued that the statute permits the government to obtain restraining orders based solely on an indictment and thereby to deprive a defendant of property needed for counsel without a prior adversarial hearing.50 He concluded that this procedure fails to provide adequate protection for both property rights and the right to counsel.51 The serious due-process concerns could have been avoided by a narrower statutory construction that preserved the discretionary language in the Act.52
The majority's approach allows the government to beggar defendants before trial and thereby disable their defense.53