556 U.S. 868 (2009)
In August 2002 a West Virginia jury found A. T. Massey Coal Co. and its affiliates liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations and awarded Hugh Caperton, Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages.1
In June 2004 the trial court denied Massey's post-trial motions, and in March 2005 it denied Massey's motion for judgment as a matter of law.2 During the 2004 judicial election cycle Don Blankenship, Massey's chairman, chief executive officer, and president, contributed the statutory maximum of $1,000 to Brent Benjamin's campaign committee, almost $2.5 million to the §527 organization And For The Sake Of The Kids that opposed incumbent Justice McGraw and supported Benjamin, and just over $500,000 in independent expenditures for mailings, letters, television, and newspaper advertisements supporting Benjamin.
Blankenship's $3 million in contributions were more than the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee.3 Benjamin won the election with 382,036 votes (53.3 percent) to McGraw's 334,301 votes (46.7 percent).4 In October 2005, before Massey filed its petition for appeal, Caperton moved to disqualify now-Justice Benjamin under the Due Process Clause and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.5
Justice Benjamin denied the motion in April 2006.6 In December 2006 Massey filed its petition for appeal, which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted.7 In November 2007 that court reversed the $50 million verdict in a 3-to-2 decision in which Justice Benjamin joined the majority.8 Caperton sought rehearing, and the parties moved for disqualification of three justices; Justice Maynard recused after photographs surfaced of him vacationing with Blankenship, and Justice Starcher recused, but Justice Benjamin again declined to recuse.9
Justice Benjamin, now acting chief justice, selected two replacement judges. Caperton moved a third time for disqualification, supported by a public opinion poll showing that over 67 percent of West Virginians doubted Justice Benjamin's impartiality, but he again refused.10 In April 2008 the court again reversed the verdict in a 3-to-2 decision.11 Four months later Justice Benjamin filed a concurring opinion defending both the merits and his participation.12 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.13
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires recusal of a state supreme court justice who received extraordinary campaign contributions from the chairman and principal officer of a corporate party in a case that was pending or imminent at the time of the contributions?14
The Due Process Clause requires recusal when the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.15 This objective inquiry asks whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.16 A serious risk arises when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.17 The inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size compared to the total amount contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect on the outcome, along with the temporal relationship between the contributions, the election, and the pendency of the case.18
Yes. The objective standard does not require proof of actual bias but focuses instead on the realistic risk created by the contributions' size and timing.19 Blankenship's $3 million in contributions to support Benjamin exceeded the total spent by all other Benjamin supporters and were three times the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee.20
Benjamin won an election decided by fewer than 50,000 votes.21 The $50 million adverse jury verdict against Massey had already been entered before the election, making it reasonably foreseeable that the case would reach the newly elected justice on appeal.22 These extraordinary contributions were made at a time when Blankenship had a vested stake in the outcome, creating a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin's recusal under the Due Process Clause.23
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires Justice Benjamin's recusal in this case.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, And Alito
Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the majority's new probability-of-bias standard is inherently boundless and provides no clear guidance to judges or litigants.25 He emphasized that due process has historically required recusal only in two narrow situations: when a judge has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in the case or when the judge presides over certain criminal contempt proceedings arising from the defendant's hostility toward the judge.26 Roberts argued that vaguer notions of appearance of bias have always been left to legislation, court rules, and codes of conduct rather than the Constitution.27
He warned that the decision would invite a flood of recusal motions, erode public confidence in the judiciary, and force judges to act as political scientists and psychologists, ultimately doing more harm than good to the perceived fairness of the courts.28
Justice Scalia dissented separately, contending that the decision creates vast uncertainty in the law that can be raised in virtually every litigated case in the thirty-nine states that elect judges.29 He maintained that the principal effect will be to diminish public confidence by reinforcing the perception that litigation is merely a game in which resourceful lawyers can deploy endless procedural gambits, now including the Caperton claim.30 Scalia observed that the facts and the indeterminate new legal standard will themselves require extensive litigation, consuming billable hours on campaign-finance reports and contested recusal decisions.31
He concluded that the Due Process Clause does not contain answers to all perceived imperfections in the judicial system and that the Court's expansion of constitutional mandate without a discernible rule does more harm than good.32