523 U.S. 392 (1998)
A grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana, indicted petitioner Terry Campbell on one count of second-degree murder.1 Campbell, who is white, filed a timely pretrial motion to quash the indictment on the grounds the grand jury was constituted in violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.2 Campbell alleged a longstanding practice of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in the parish.3
His sole piece of evidence is that, between January 1976 and August 1993, no black person served as a grand jury foreperson in the parish, even though more than 20 percent of the registered voters were black persons.4 The State does not dispute this evidence.5 In Louisiana, the judge selects the foreperson from the grand jury venire before the remaining members of the grand jury have been chosen by lot, and in addition to his other duties, the foreperson of the Louisiana grand jury has the same full voting powers as other grand jury members.6
The trial judge refused to quash the indictment because “Campbell, being a white man accused of killing another white man,” lacked standing to complain “where all of the forepersons were white.”7 After Campbell’s first trial resulted in a mistrial, he was retried, convicted of second-degree murder, and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.8 Campbell renewed his challenge to the grand jury foreperson selection procedures in a motion for new trial, which was denied.9
The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, because, under our decision in Powers v. Ohio, Campbell had standing to object to the alleged discrimination even though he is white.10 The Court of Appeal remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing because it found Campbell’s evidence of discrimination inadequate.11 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.12 It distinguished Powers as turning on the “considerable and substantial impact” that a prosecutor’s discriminatory use of peremptory challenges has on a defendant’s trial as well as on the integrity of the judicial system.13 The court declined to extend Powers to a claim of discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreperson.14 It also found Hobby v. United States did not afford Campbell standing to raise a due process objection.15
Because the Court of Appeal had not addressed Campbell’s other asserted points of error, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case.16 After the Court of Appeal rejected Campbell’s remaining claims, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to reconsider its ruling on the grand jury issue.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the narrow question of Campbell’s standing to raise equal protection, due process, and fair-cross-section claims.18
Whether a white criminal defendant has standing to object to discrimination against black persons in the selection of grand jurors on equal protection grounds?19
In Powers v. Ohio, a white defendant has third-party standing to assert the equal protection rights of black persons excluded from jury service if three preconditions are met: the defendant suffered an injury in fact, he had a close relationship to the excluded jurors, and there was some hindrance to the excluded jurors asserting their own rights.20
Yes. Campbell satisfies all three preconditions when the rule is applied to the established facts.21 Campbell is a white defendant indicted on one count of second-degree murder of another white man in Evangeline Parish.22 He suffers an injury in fact because the alleged longstanding racial discrimination in grand jury foreperson selection tainted the composition of the grand jury itself.23 Louisiana uses a distinctive procedure in which the judge selects the foreperson from the venire before the remaining members are chosen by lot.24 The foreperson exercises full voting powers equivalent to other grand jurors.25 The evidence shows no black foreperson served between January 1976 and August 1993 despite more than twenty percent of registered voters being black persons.26 This casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of the indictment decision.27
Campbell shares a close relationship with the excluded black venirepersons because both have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from grand jury selection.28 Campbell possesses a strong incentive to advocate effectively given that a successful claim may overturn his conviction and life sentence.29 Excluded grand jurors face the same economic disincentives and practical barriers to vindicating their own rights as excluded petit jurors.30 The Louisiana courts' refusal to extend Powers therefore conflicts with the rule.31
Campbell has standing to raise the equal protection claim.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas dissents from the equal protection standing analysis in Part III.33 He argues that Powers v. Ohio was wrongly decided and should be overruled.34 A defendant cannot demonstrate injury in fact from alleged discrimination against third-party veniremen of another race.35
No close relationship exists between a white defendant and excluded black veniremen.36 Excluded jurors have other avenues to vindicate their rights especially where systematic discrimination over many years is alleged.37 He further notes that the properly constituted petit jury convicted Campbell.38
Campbell himself used peremptory strikes against black veniremen. This confirms the absence of any effect on the trial outcome.39
Whether a white criminal defendant has standing to raise a due process challenge to discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreperson?40
A criminal defendant has standing to litigate his own due process claim that his conviction was procured by procedures contravening fundamental fairness, as implicitly recognized in Hobby v. United States and Peters v. Kiff.41 The ministerial character of federal foreperson duties does not control when state law gives the foreperson full voting power and selects that juror before the rest of the grand jury is empaneled.42
Yes. Campbell has standing to assert his own due process rights because the established facts demonstrate that Louisiana's grand jury foreperson selection directly affects the composition of the grand jury.43 Under the state procedure the judge chooses the foreperson from the venire before the remaining members are selected by lot.44 That foreperson possesses the same voting authority as every other grand juror, including the power to vote on whether to indict Campbell for second-degree murder.45 This distinguishes the case from the federal system addressed in Hobby, where the foreperson was chosen from already seated jurors and performed only ministerial tasks.46
The trial judge's refusal to quash the indictment and the Louisiana Supreme Court's erroneous extension of Hobby to deny standing therefore cannot stand.47
Campbell has standing to raise the due process claim.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment on the due process standing issue. He agrees that Campbell asserts his own due process right and therefore possesses standing to litigate the claim. He joins Parts I, II, IV, and V of the opinion.49
Nevertheless, he observes that Campbell is unlikely to prevail on the merits of any due process claim. The properly constituted petit jury returned a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This verdict conclusively establishes that no reasonable grand jury could have failed to indict him.50
His agreement is limited to the standing question and does not address the nature or extent of any due process right.51
Whether a white criminal defendant has standing to raise a fair-cross-section claim regarding grand jury selection?52
With very rare exceptions the Court will not consider a petitioner's federal claim unless the claim was addressed by or properly presented to the state court whose decision is under review.53
No. The Court declines to address the fair-cross-section standing question because Campbell made no effort to show that the claim was properly presented to the Louisiana Court of Appeal or Supreme Court even after the State pointed out the omission before this Court.54 He devoted only a single page of his brief to the issue.55 This confirms that the lower courts never considered the contention.56
The Court does not reach the fair-cross-section standing question.57