453 U.S. 355 (1981)
On January 30, 1978, Mrs. Donna Iris Erickson was murdered in Tulare County, California.1 Respondent Randall James Prysock, a minor, and a co-defendant were apprehended later that evening for the offense.2 Prysock was taken to a substation of the Tulare County Sheriff's Department where he was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and initially declined to speak with officers.3
Prysock's parents were notified of his detention and arrived at the substation.4 After meeting with his parents, Prysock agreed to answer questions from the police.5 A taped interview was conducted with Sergeant Byrd questioning Prysock in the presence of his parents.6 The tape recording captured the specific warnings provided to Prysock regarding his rights to remain silent, to have counsel present, and to appointed counsel at no cost.
Following the taped warnings, at the request of Mrs. Prysock, an off-the-record conversation occurred.7 Mrs. Prysock inquired whether her son could still obtain an attorney at a later time if he provided a statement without one present.8 Sergeant Byrd responded that Prysock would have an attorney when he went to court and could have one at that time if he wished.9
At trial in the Superior Court of Tulare County, the court denied Prysock's motion to suppress the taped statement.10 A jury convicted Prysock of first-degree murder with special circumstances of torture and robbery, as well as robbery with use of a dangerous weapon, burglary with use of a deadly weapon, automobile theft, escape from a youth facility, and destruction of evidence.11
The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District reversed the convictions, finding error in the Miranda warnings given.12 The California Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing.13 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.14
Whether the warnings given to respondent prior to a recorded conversation with a police officer satisfied the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona?15
Miranda requires that prior to any questioning an accused be warned that he has the right to remain silent.16 Anything he says can be used against him in a court of law.17 He has the right to the presence of an attorney.18 If he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.19 The Constitution does not require a talismanic incantation of the precise language contained in the Miranda opinion.20 The warnings must convey the essential information without linking the right to appointed counsel to a future point in time after police interrogation.21
Yes. The taped warnings given by Sergeant Byrd to Prysock in the presence of his parents informed him of his right to remain silent.22 Anything he said could and would be used as evidence against him in a court of law.23 He had the right to talk to a lawyer before he was questioned and to have that lawyer present with him while being questioned and all during the questioning.24
As a juvenile he had the right to have his parents present.25 He also had the right to have a lawyer appointed to represent him at no cost to himself.26 These warnings were delivered before any questioning resumed after the initial refusal to talk.27 They fully conveyed Prysock's right to appointed counsel prior to and during interrogation without suggesting any limitation to a future time such as court proceedings.28
The subsequent off-the-record conversation initiated by Mrs. Prysock confirms that the rights were understood as available at the time of questioning.29 The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the resulting statement that led to Prysock's convictions for first-degree murder with special circumstances and the other offenses.30
The warnings satisfied the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the warning was constitutionally inadequate because it failed to convey the crucial information that the services of a free attorney were available prior to the impending questioning.32 He observed that the police sergeant described the right to counsel present during questioning and then after an interlude discussing the right to parents present separately informed Prysock of the right to appointed counsel.33 This created an ambiguity that the California Court of Appeal reasonably found insufficient under Miranda.34
Stevens further noted that the post-warning colloquy with Prysock's parents focused on their option to hire a lawyer.35 This demonstrated that the reference to appointed counsel could reasonably have been understood as referring only to trial counsel rather than counsel before questioning.36 He concluded that the state courts' conscientious appraisal of the ambiguous record did not warrant summary reversal by this Court.37
Whether Miranda or any other decision of this Court mandates a rigid rule requiring that the content of Miranda warnings be a virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the Miranda opinion?38
This Court has never indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.39 Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures.40 The warnings required and the waiver necessary are in the absence of a fully effective equivalent prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.41
No. The California Court of Appeal essentially laid down a flat rule requiring that the content of Miranda warnings be a virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the Miranda opinion.42 The court stressed the precise requirements and rigidity of Miranda as its greatest strength.43 This rigid approach was not mandated by Miranda or any other decision of this Court.44
The Court has instead examined whether the reference to the right to appointed counsel was linked with some future point in time after police interrogation.45 Such linkage occurred in cases such as People v. Bolinski where warnings tied appointment to charging or to a specific county court.46 Here the warnings linked the right to a lawyer before during and all during questioning without any such temporal limitation.47 Therefore the Court of Appeal erred in holding them inadequate simply because of the order in which the rights were recited.48
Miranda does not mandate a rigid rule requiring that the content of Miranda warnings be a virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the Miranda opinion.49