416 U.S. 663 (1974)
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. leased a pleasure yacht to two Puerto Rican residents in March 1971.1 Puerto Rican authorities discovered marihuana on board the yacht in early May 1972 and charged one of the lessees with violation of the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico.2
On July 11, 1972, the Superintendent of Police seized the yacht pursuant to P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24, §§ 2512 (a) (4), (b), and Tit. 34, § 1722 without prior notice to appellee or either lessee and without a prior adversary hearing.3 The lessees were given notice within 10 days of the seizure.4 When a challenge to the seizure was not made within 15 days after service of the notice, the yacht was forfeited for official use of the Government of Puerto Rico.5
Appellee first learned of the seizure and forfeiture when attempting to repossess the yacht from the lessees because of their apparent failure to pay rent.6 It is conceded that appellee was in no way involved in the criminal enterprise carried on by the lessee.7 Appellee had no knowledge that its property was being used in connection with or in violation of Puerto Rican law.8 On November 6, 1972, appellee filed this suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the statutes had unconstitutionally denied it due process of law and unconstitutionally deprived it of its property without just compensation.9
A three-judge District Court held that the failure of the statutes to provide for preseizure notice and hearing rendered them constitutionally defective and that the statutes unconstitutionally deprived appellee of property without just compensation.10 The District Court enjoined appellants from enforcing the statutes in those respects.11 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.12
Whether enactments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico qualify as State statutes for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act?13
Yes. The three-judge District Court was properly convened to hear Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.'s challenge to the Puerto Rican statutes.16 Direct appeal to this Court was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Established federal judicial practice after the 1952 compact treats Commonwealth enactments as State statutes for the Three-Judge Court Act.17 The case involved a challenge to those statutes' constitutionality.18
Enactments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico qualify as State statutes for purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas agreed that Puerto Rico is a State for purposes of three-judge court jurisdiction under the Three-Judge Court Act.20 He emphasized the Commonwealth's status under its compact with Congress after 1952.21 Douglas dissented on the merits of the due process and compensation claims.22
He argued that the two-month delay between discovery and seizure eliminated any special need for prompt action.23 Douglas viewed the forfeiture without notice to the owner as a classic case of lack of procedural due process.24
Whether the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes violate due process by authorizing seizure of a vessel without prior notice or hearing?25
Due process permits postponement of notice and hearing when seizure serves an important governmental interest.26 A special need for prompt action exists in such cases.27 Government officials initiate the seizure under a narrowly drawn statute.28 These factors create an extraordinary situation justifying immediate action to secure jurisdiction and prevent removal or destruction of the property.29
No. Seizure of the yacht under P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24, §§ 2512 (a) (4), (b), and Tit.
34, § 1722 served significant governmental purposes by allowing Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the property.30 The seizure fostered the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the yacht and in enforcing criminal sanctions.31 Preseizure notice and hearing might have frustrated those interests because the yacht could have been removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed.32 Commonwealth officials rather than self-interested private parties determined that seizure was appropriate under the statutes.33
These factors created an extraordinary situation justifying postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure.
The Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes do not violate due process by authorizing seizure of a vessel without prior notice or hearing.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White joined the Court's opinion on the due process issue.35 He agreed that there was no constitutional necessity under Fuentes v. Shevin or any other case to accord the owner-lessor of the yacht a hearing in the circumstances of this case.36 White added that the presence of important public interests permitting dispensing with a preseizure hearing is only one of the situations in which no prior hearing is required.37
He referenced other precedents such as Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. and Arnett v. Kennedy.38
Justice Douglas dissented on the due process issue.39 The discovery of marihuana on the yacht took place on May 6, 1972.40 The seizure of the yacht took place on July 11, 1972, over two months later.41
In view of the long delay there was no special need for very prompt action as emphasized in Fuentes v. Shevin.42 Postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure was not needed.43 Forfeiture without notice to the owner constituted a classic case of lack of procedural due process.44
Whether the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes unconstitutionally deprive an innocent lessor of property without just compensation?45
Statutory forfeiture schemes do not unconstitutionally deprive innocent owners of property without just compensation.46 The thing is considered the offender under long-standing precedent.47 Such statutes are sustained as applied to innocents to serve punitive and deterrent purposes.48 The owner here voluntarily entrusted the property without proving it did all reasonably possible to prevent unlawful use.49
No. The Puerto Rican statutes further punitive and deterrent purposes by preventing further illicit use of the yacht and imposing an economic penalty that renders illegal behavior unprofitable.50 Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. voluntarily entrusted the yacht to the lessees in March 1971.51 No allegation or proof showed that the company did all it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use after the May 1972 discovery of marihuana on board.52
The Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes do not unconstitutionally deprive an innocent lessor of property without just compensation.53
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on the compensation issue.54 Forfeiture of the yacht belonging to a wholly innocent lessor constituted a taking of private property for public use under the Fifth Amendment.55 The lessor had included a lease prohibition against unlawful use.56
Compensation must be paid an innocent owner where the owner is in no way implicated in the illegal project.57 Douglas would remand the case to the three-judge court for findings as to the innocence of the lessor of the yacht.58 The findings would determine whether the illegal use was of such magnitude or notoriety that the owner cannot be found faultless in remaining ignorant of its occurrence.59