391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968)
Bumper was brought to trial in a North Carolina court upon a charge of rape, an offense punishable in that State by death unless the jury recommended life imprisonment. Among the items of evidence introduced by the prosecution at the trial was a .22-caliber rifle allegedly used in the commission of the crime. The jury found Bumper guilty but recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court imposed that sentence, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment.
Sixteen of fifty-three prospective jurors were excused for cause because of their opposition to capital punishment.1
Bumper lived with his grandmother, Mrs. Hattie Leath, a sixty-six-year-old Negro widow, in a house located in a rural area at the end of an isolated mile-long dirt road. Two days after the alleged offense but prior to Bumper's arrest, four white law enforcement officers—the county sheriff, two of his deputies, and a state investigator—went to this house and found Mrs. Leath there with some young children. She met the officers at the front door. One of them announced that he had a search warrant to search the house. Mrs. Leath responded by telling the officers to come on in and opened the door. In the kitchen the officers found the rifle that was later introduced in evidence at Bumper's trial.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecutor informed the court that he did not rely upon a warrant to justify the search but upon the consent of Mrs. Leath. She testified that four officers came to the house, that one walked up and said he had a search warrant to search the house, that she told them to come on in, that the officer did not read the warrant to her, and that she believed he had a search warrant and took him at his word. The trial court found that Mrs. Leath had voluntarily consented to the search and denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of North Carolina approved the admission of the evidence on the same basis.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the two constitutional claims pressed by Bumper throughout the litigation in the North Carolina courts.
Whether the petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated in this capital case when the prosecution was permitted to challenge for cause all prospective jurors who stated that they were opposed to capital punishment or had conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty?2
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, a death sentence cannot constitutionally be executed if imposed by a jury from which have been excluded for cause those who, without more, are opposed to capital punishment or have conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty.3 A defendant claiming bias in the guilt phase must adduce evidence that the jury is prosecution prone.4
No. The petitioner adduced no evidence to support the claim that a jury selected as this one was is necessarily prosecution prone.5 The materials referred to in his brief are no more substantial than those brought to our attention in Witherspoon.6 Sixteen of fifty-three prospective jurors were excused for cause because of their opposition to capital punishment.
The conviction is not reversed on the jury issue.7
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black argued that the jury issue became moot since the petitioner had been sentenced to life imprisonment.8 He would dismiss the petition as improvidently granted because the jury recommended life imprisonment in a case with horrible facts.9 This showed the premise of Witherspoon is fallacious.10 The jury unanimously recommended life imprisonment despite the brutal nature of the crime.11
Whether the .22-caliber rifle introduced in evidence against the petitioner was obtained by the State in a search and seizure violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?12
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.13 This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.14 When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, the situation is instinct with coercion, and there cannot be consent.15
The admission of the rifle was constitutional error, and the judgment is reversed.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan joined in the judgment and Part II of the opinion.21 He noted that reversal results from a decision that petitioner was not constitutionally proved guilty.22 He emphasized that the consent was obtained immediately after the sheriff told Mrs. Leath that he had a search warrant.23
Nothing she said can be taken to mean that she considered the officers welcome with or without a warrant.24 He would not remand because the prosecution renounced reliance on the warrant.25
Justice Black believed that Mrs. Leath voluntarily consented to the search.26 She actually wanted the officers to search her house to prove she had nothing to hide.27 The Court should not substitute what it believes Mrs. Leath should have said for what she actually said.28
It was all her own free will.29 Even assuming no consent, the overwhelming evidence of guilt should allow the conviction to stand without automatic reversal under the exclusionary rule.30
Justice White would view the consent as conditioned on there being a valid warrant.31 The evidence does not show unconditional consent with sufficient clarity.32 Since the State represented there was a warrant, he would vacate the conviction.33 He would return the case to the state courts for a determination of the validity of the warrant rather than reverse outright.34