563 U.S. 493 (2011)
California's prisons were designed to house a population just under 80,000.1 At the time of the decision under review the population was almost double that number, reaching approximately 156,000 inmates.2
In Coleman v. Brown, filed in 1990, the District Court found after a 39-day trial in 1995 that prisoners with serious mental illness did not receive minimal, adequate care.3 The Coleman court appointed a Special Master to oversee remedial efforts.4
In Plata v. Brown, filed in 2001, the State conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights and stipulated to a remedial injunction.5 When the State had not complied by 2005, the Plata court appointed a Receiver to oversee remedial efforts.6
Twelve years after the Coleman Special Master's appointment and five years after the Plata consent decree, the Coleman and Plata plaintiffs moved their respective District Courts to convene a three-judge court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act to order reductions in the prison population.7 The judges in both actions granted the requests.8
The cases were consolidated before a single three-judge court composed of the Coleman and Plata District Judges and a third Ninth Circuit Judge.9 The three-judge court heard 14 days of testimony, including from prison officials, experts, the Special Master, and the Receiver.10 The three-judge court made extensive findings of fact regarding staff vacancies, treatment delays, suicides, preventable deaths, and the impact of overcrowding on medical and mental health care delivery.11
The three-judge court ordered California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years.12 A reduction that could require releasing as many as 46,000 persons absent new construction or other measures.13 The court directed the State to formulate a compliance plan and submit it for approval.14 The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1253.15 The Court postponed consideration of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits.16 During the pendency of the appeal, the State reduced its prison population by at least 9,000 persons.17 The three-judge court's order left the choice of means to achieve the reduction to the discretion of state officials, including good-time credits, diversion of low-risk offenders, and transfers.18
Whether the Coleman and Plata district courts acted reasonably in convening a three-judge court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act?19
Under the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(3)(A), a three-judge court may be convened only after a district court has entered an order for less intrusive relief that failed to remedy the constitutional violation and has given the defendant a reasonable time to comply.20
Yes. The Coleman court satisfied the previous-order requirement through the 1995 appointment of the Special Master after the 39-day trial finding systematic failure to deliver mental health care.21 The Plata court satisfied it through the 2002 consent decree and stipulated injunction after the State conceded Eighth Amendment violations.22 Both orders were given ample time—12 years in Coleman and 5 years in Plata.23
Yet the Special Master reported in 2007 that mental health care was deteriorating due to overcrowding.24 The Plata Receiver reported in 2008 continuing deficiencies caused by overcrowding.25 The district courts reasonably doubted that further construction and hiring efforts would succeed without population reduction.26
The district courts acted reasonably in convening the three-judge court.27
Whether the three-judge court properly found that crowding was the primary cause of the Eighth Amendment violations?28
The PLRA requires the three-judge court to find by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a federal right, meaning the foremost cause even if other factors contribute.29
Yes. The three-judge court found after 14 days of testimony that staff vacancy rates reached 54.1 percent for psychiatrists and 20 percent for surgeons.30 Backlogs reached 700 prisoners waiting for doctors.31 Prisoners were held in phone-booth-sized cages for up to 24 hours.32
72.1 percent of suicides involved inadequate assessment or treatment.33 These conditions were directly tied to the population of approximately 156,000 inmates in facilities designed for just under 80,000.34 Experts testified that crowding was the foremost cause preventing delivery of adequate medical and mental health care.35
The three-judge court properly found crowding the primary cause.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish a systemwide Eighth Amendment violation because the class action aggregated claims that were not individually viable.37 He argued that the theory of systemic unconstitutionality was procedurally and substantively wrong.38 The mere existence of the inadequate system does not subject to cruel and unusual punishment the entire prison population in need of medical care, including those who receive it.
The remedy therefore exceeded the PLRA's limits on relief extending no further than necessary to correct the violation of a particular plaintiff's federal right.39
Whether the three-judge court properly found that no other relief would remedy the violations?40
The PLRA requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence that no other relief will remedy the violation before a population limit may be ordered.41
Yes. The three-judge court found no realistic possibility that new construction would succeed given California's fiscal crisis and delayed funding.42 Out-of-state transfers in sufficient numbers were not planned.43 Additional hiring was unrealistic because of chronic understaffing and lack of space.44
Continued efforts by the Receiver and Special Master would fail without population reduction.45 Both officials reported that overcrowding posed a significant barrier and that any remedy without reduction would require vast expenditures the State had not provided in 12 years of Coleman and 9 years of Plata litigation.46
The three-judge court properly found no other relief would remedy the violations.47
Whether the population limit ordered by the three-judge court was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary, and was the least intrusive means necessary?48
Under the PLRA, prospective relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right of particular plaintiffs, and be the least intrusive means necessary, while giving substantial weight to public safety.49
Yes. The order set the limit at 137.5 percent of design capacity.50 It gave the State flexibility to choose means including good-time credits, diversion of low-risk offenders, and transfers.51 It permitted the State to move for modification.52 Although the reduction would affect prisoners outside the plaintiff classes, the court found the systemwide violation required systemwide relief.53 The order left substantial discretion to state officials while addressing the risk that future class members would suffer from ongoing deficiencies.54
The population limit was narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary.55
Whether the three-judge court gave substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety?56
The PLRA requires that any prospective relief give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system.57
Yes. The three-judge court devoted nearly 10 days of trial to public safety. It credited statistical evidence that population reductions in other jurisdictions and California counties had not increased crime.58 It found that methods such as good-time credits and diversion of low-risk offenders would have little or no adverse impact.59 It gave the State flexibility to select among those methods while leaving implementation details to state officials.60
The three-judge court gave substantial weight to public safety.61
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Alito dissented on the ground that the three-judge court gave inadequate weight to public safety because it approved a release order that state officials themselves found could not be implemented without unacceptable harm.62 He argued that the court improperly relied on outdated evidence and expert predictions that amounted to policy judgments rather than proper factfinding.63 The order risked releasing thousands of inmates who would commit new crimes as had occurred under prior release orders in Philadelphia.64
Common sense and experience counsel greater caution before ordering the early release of 46,000 inmates.65
Whether the three-judge court erred in setting the population cap at 137.5% of design capacity and imposing a two-year deadline?66
When imposing a population limit, the court must set the limit at the highest level consistent with an efficacious remedy and order the reduction achieved in the shortest period reasonably consistent with public safety. The order remains subject to modification.67
No. The three-judge court selected 137.5 percent after considering expert testimony supporting limits between 130 percent and 145 percent.68 The two-year deadline was proposed by plaintiffs and not contested by the State at trial.69 The court retained authority to modify the order upon a proper showing.70 The State had already reduced the population by 9,000 during the appeal.71
The three-judge court did not err in setting the cap and deadline.72