338 U.S. 160 (1949)
On the evening of March 3, 1947, Alcohol Tax Unit investigator Malsed and special investigator Creehan were parked beside a highway near the Quapaw Bridge in northeastern Oklahoma about five miles west of the Missouri-Oklahoma line.1
Brinegar drove past headed west in his Ford coupe.2 Malsed recognized both Brinegar and the car from prior contacts that included arresting him five months earlier for illegal liquor transportation, observing him loading liquor into a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri on at least two occasions during the preceding six months, and knowing his reputation for hauling liquor.3 The agents observed that Brinegar's car appeared heavily loaded.4
Brinegar increased his speed as he passed the officers.5 The agents gave chase, pursued him for about a mile at top speed, gained on him after his car skidded on a curve, sounded their siren, overtook him, and crowded his car to the side of the road.6 As the agents walked back toward the car, Malsed asked Brinegar how much liquor he had in the car this time.7 Brinegar replied that he did not have too much and, after further questioning, admitted he had twelve cases.8 The agents found one case on the front seat and twelve more under and behind the front seat, then placed Brinegar under arrest and seized the liquor.9
Brinegar was charged with importing intoxicating liquor into Oklahoma from Missouri in violation of federal statute.10 Prior to trial he moved to suppress the seized liquor as the product of an unlawful search and seizure.11 The district court denied the motion after a hearing, renewed the objection at trial was overruled, and Brinegar was convicted.12 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Amendment question presented by the warrantless search and seizure of the liquor from Brinegar's automobile.14
Whether the facts and circumstances known to federal agents on March 3, 1947, constituted probable cause to search Brinegar's automobile without a warrant?15
The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches of automobiles when officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.16 Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.17
Yes. The agents recognized Brinegar and his Ford coupe from prior direct observations.18 Malsed had arrested Brinegar five months earlier for illegal transportation of liquor.19 He had seen Brinegar loading liquor into a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri, on at least two occasions during the preceding six months.20
Malsed knew Brinegar to have a reputation for hauling liquor.21 As Brinegar passed, the agents saw that the car appeared heavily loaded.22 These facts supplied the same ultimate indicators of ongoing illegal transportation that Carroll held sufficient.23
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Joined by Justices Frankfurter And Murphy
Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that the agents acted on reputation and a prior arrest without conviction.27 Such evidence would not be admissible at trial to prove guilt.28 He contrasted the facts with Carroll, where officers obtained direct personal knowledge through their own attempted purchase of liquor.29
Jackson viewed the lower courts' conclusion that these facts fell short of probable cause as binding.30 He warned that the decision would expand Carroll into blanket authority for stops on suspicion alone.31
Whether Brinegar's statements after the vehicle stop could establish probable cause for the search if earlier facts were insufficient?32
No. The agents already possessed probable cause from their pre-stop observations of Brinegar's recent liquor-loading activity, prior arrest, and heavily laden car traveling the supply route.35 The post-stop colloquy in which Brinegar admitted having twelve cases was not needed to justify the search.36 The district court's alternative holding that the admission alone could cure any earlier deficiency was therefore unnecessary.37
Because the pre-stop facts independently established probable cause, the Court did not rely on the post-stop statements to validate the search.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Burton joined the majority but wrote separately to clarify the timing of probable cause.39 He noted that whether probable cause existed before the agents caught up with Brinegar, it clearly existed after the colloquy in which Brinegar admitted he did not have too much liquor.40 Burton stressed that the agents had ample grounds to justify the chase and interrogation based on the heavily laden car traveling from Missouri into Oklahoma.41
In his view, the agents had a positive duty to investigate further when facts pointed to a crime in progress.42 The voluntary admission then supplied indisputable probable cause for the search without a warrant.43 Burton concluded that the interrogation was a proper exercise of law enforcement duties that halted the crime and led to the arrest.44
Whether evidence of Brinegar's prior arrest and liquor-loading observations was properly considered at the suppression hearing to determine probable cause?45
Evidence that would be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt, such as prior arrests or reputation, may nevertheless be received at a suppression hearing.46 The issue is probable cause rather than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.47 The ordinary rules of evidence do not apply with the same force in the non-jury determination of whether officers had reasonable grounds to act.48
Yes. Malsed's testimony that he had arrested Brinegar five months earlier and had personally observed him loading liquor into vehicles in Joplin was admitted at the suppression hearing even though excluded at trial.49 The differing standards are appropriate because probable cause requires only a practical, nontechnical probability that a reasonable officer would act.50 The district judge properly considered the evidence for that limited purpose.51