395 U.S. 238 (1969)
In the spring of 1966, within the period of a fortnight, a series of armed robberies occurred in Mobile, Alabama.1 The victims, in each case, were local shopkeepers open at night who were forced by a gunman to hand over money.2 While robbing one grocery store, the assailant fired his gun once, sending a bullet through a door into the ceiling.3 A few days earlier in a drugstore, the robber had allowed his gun to discharge in such a way that the bullet, on ricochet from the floor, struck a customer in the leg.4
Shortly thereafter, a local grand jury returned five indictments against petitioner, a 27-year-old Negro, for common-law robbery—an offense punishable in Alabama by death.5 Before the matter came to trial, the court determined that petitioner was indigent and appointed counsel to represent him.6 Three days later, at his arraignment, petitioner pleaded guilty to all five indictments.7 So far as the record shows, the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner did not address the court.8
Alabama provides that when a defendant pleads guilty, the court must cause the punishment to be determined by a jury and may cause witnesses to be examined, to ascertain the character of the offense.9 In the present case a trial of that dimension was held, the prosecution presenting its case largely through eyewitness testimony.10 Although counsel for petitioner engaged in cursory cross-examination, petitioner neither testified himself nor presented testimony concerning his character and background.11 There was nothing to indicate that he had a prior criminal record.12
In instructing the jury, the judge stressed that petitioner had pleaded guilty in five cases of robbery, defined as the felonious taking of money from another against his will by violence or by putting him in fear, carrying from ten years minimum in the penitentiary to the supreme penalty of death by electrocution.13 The jury, upon deliberation, found petitioner guilty and sentenced him severally to die on each of the five indictments.14
Taking an automatic appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, petitioner argued that a sentence of death for common-law robbery was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, a suggestion which that court unanimously rejected.15 On their own motion, however, four of the seven justices discussed the constitutionality of the process by which the trial judge had accepted petitioner's guilty plea.16 From the order affirming the trial court, three justices dissented on the ground that the record was inadequate to show that petitioner had intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty.17 The fourth member concurred separately, conceding that a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea unless he has determined that such a plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered by the defendant, but refusing for aught appearing to presume that the trial judge failed to do his duty.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.19
Whether the voluntary character of a guilty plea is properly presented for review when raised for the first time in the state supreme court on automatic appeal in a capital case?20
Alabama's automatic appeal statute in capital cases requires the reviewing court to comb the record for any error prejudicial to the appellant, even though not called to the court's attention in brief of counsel.21
Yes. The petitioner did not raise the voluntariness issue below, yet the Alabama Supreme Court considered it on its own motion under the automatic appeal statute, with four justices explicitly discussing the constitutional implications of the silent record.22 The statute mandates review for plain error in death cases, and the state court majority addressed the federal question directly.23
The voluntary character of the guilty plea is properly presented for review.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Harlan accepts that jurisdiction exists to review the voluntary character of the guilty plea.25 He states that he is willing to accept the majority's view that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the question even though petitioner never raised it below.26 Harlan notes that the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the issue on its own motion under the automatic appeal statute.27
He ultimately concludes that this jurisdictional point does not support reversal of the convictions.28
Whether a guilty plea may be accepted without an affirmative showing on the record that it was made intelligently and voluntarily?29
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.30 First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth.31 Second, is the right to trial by jury.32 Third, is the right to confront one's accusers.33 We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.34
No. The record here is wholly silent because the judge asked no questions of the petitioner concerning his plea and the petitioner did not address the court at arraignment.35 Nothing in the record indicates any inquiry into the petitioner's understanding of the rights waived or the consequences of the five guilty pleas to capital offenses.36 The three dissenting justices in the Alabama Supreme Court correctly identified reversible error on this ground.37
A guilty plea may not be accepted without an affirmative showing on the record that it was made intelligently and voluntarily.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Harlan dissents from the constitutional holding that reverses the convictions outright. He argues that the majority improperly fastens the rigid prophylactic requirements of Rule 11 onto the states as a matter of federal due process. Harlan emphasizes that the petitioner never alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary or unknowing at any stage.39
He points out that recent precedent in Halliday declined to apply such requirements retroactively even in federal cases.40 Harlan concludes that the petitioner is not entitled to reversal simply because of the record's inadequacy and that post-conviction remedies remain available to test voluntariness.41