132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012)
In November 2007, one-year-old Matthew McFadden, Jr. suffered a severe head injury while home with his mother’s boyfriend, Alex Blueford.1 Despite hospital treatment, McFadden died a few days later.2 The State of Arkansas charged Blueford with capital murder, waiving the death penalty, and the charge included the lesser offenses of first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide.3
The trial court instructed the jury to consider the offenses in descending order, moving to a lesser offense only upon reasonable doubt of guilt on the greater one.4 The court provided five verdict forms: four for conviction on each individual offense and one for acquittal on all offenses.5 No form permitted acquittal on some offenses but not others, and any verdict required unanimity.6
After several hours of deliberation and two Allen instructions, the jury reported it could not reach a verdict.7 The foreperson disclosed that the jury had voted unanimously against guilt on capital murder and first-degree murder, stood deadlocked nine to three on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide.8 The court directed the jury to continue deliberating.9
Blueford’s counsel requested new verdict forms to record partial verdicts on the greater offenses, but the court denied the request. When the jury returned without a verdict, the court declared a mistrial.10 The State sought to retry Blueford on all charges.11 Blueford moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges.12 The trial court denied the motion, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed on interlocutory appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether the foreperson’s report that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the charges of capital murder and first-degree murder constituted an acquittal barring retrial on those charges?14
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense but does not bar retrial after a mistrial when particular circumstances manifest necessity for the declaration.15 An acquittal occurs only when a jury resolves some or all factual elements of the offense in the defendant’s favor.16 The resolution must carry the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal rather than a preliminary report during ongoing deliberations.17
No. The foreperson’s report lacked the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal on capital murder and first-degree murder.18 The jury continued deliberating after the report because the court directed further deliberation following the disclosure of the votes.19 The jury returned without a verdict after an additional half hour.20 The instructions permitted the jury to reconsider votes on greater offenses even after considering lesser ones.21
The verdict forms allowed only conviction on one offense or acquittal on all.22 The report therefore did not resolve the factual elements with the required finality under the rule.23
The foreperson’s report did not constitute an acquittal barring retrial on the charges of capital murder and first-degree murder.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Kagan
Justice Sotomayor dissented on the ground that the forewoman’s announcement in open court constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.25 Arkansas law required the jury to acquit on the greater offense before considering a lesser one.26 The forewoman’s colloquy confirmed the jury followed those instructions.27
The announcement represented a substantive determination that the prosecution failed to carry its burden on those charges.28 In her view the majority erred by speculating that the jury might have reconsidered its votes during the remaining deliberations.29
Whether the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial was improper such that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial on the charges of capital murder and first-degree murder?30
A trial court may declare a mistrial without barring retrial when the jury is unable to reach a verdict.31 This constitutes the classic basis establishing manifest necessity.32 The court is not required to consider any particular means of breaking the impasse before declaring a mistrial due to a hung jury.33
No. The trial court properly declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a verdict after receiving two Allen instructions and additional deliberation time.34 The jury’s options were limited to convicting on one of the offenses or acquitting on all.35 The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to add partial verdict forms that would have allowed acquittal on some offenses but not others.36 The reason for the mistrial has long been recognized as the classic basis for manifest necessity permitting retrial on all charges.
The trial court’s declaration of a mistrial was proper, so the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial on the charges of capital murder and first-degree murder.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Kagan
Justice Sotomayor dissented on the ground that the trial judge abused discretion by declaring a mistrial without first asking the jury whether it remained unanimous against conviction on the greater offenses.38 In an acquittal-first jurisdiction the jury’s advancement to the lesser offense demonstrated it had acquitted on the greater ones.39 The judge misperceived Arkansas law regarding the transitional instruction.40
The failure to explore modest alternatives such as repeating the earlier question negated the deference ordinarily due a mistrial ruling.41 In her view the Double Jeopardy Clause required the court to honor a request for a partial verdict before discharging the jury.42