391 U.S. 194, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968)
Pauline Owens, who had served as a practical nurse for the decedent, engaged petitioner Bloom to draw and execute a will in the decedent's name after the putative testator died on July 6, 1964.1 The will was dated June 21, 1964, prior to the testator's death.2 Bloom knew the will was false when he presented it for admission in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County.3
The State's Attorney of Cook County filed a complaint charging Bloom with contempt of court based on the filing of the spurious will.4 At his trial in the state court, Bloom made a timely demand for a jury trial, which the court refused.5
The trial court found Bloom guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty-four months.6 Bloom appealed his conviction directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.7
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that neither state law nor the Federal Constitution provided a right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings.8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial for a criminal contempt punished by a two-year prison term.9
Whether the Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial for a criminal contempt punished by a two-year prison term in state court?10
The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, applies to serious criminal contempt prosecutions in state court because such contempts are crimes indistinguishable from other serious offenses, and a two-year sentence renders the offense serious rather than petty under the rule that looks to the penalty actually imposed when no statutory maximum exists.11
Yes. The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, extends to criminal contempt prosecutions that result in serious punishment such as a two-year prison term.12 Bloom's conduct in filing the false will after the testator's death produced exactly such a sentence, and his timely demand for a jury was refused by the trial court.13 Under the approach adopted from Cheff, the actual penalty imposed serves as the measure of seriousness when no statutory maximum exists under Illinois law, rendering the contempt equivalent to other serious crimes for which jury trial is required.14
The Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial for Bloom's criminal contempt prosecution, and the state courts' denial of his timely demand was constitutional error.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Fortas joined the judgment because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide jury trials for non-petty offenses, drawing guidance from the Sixth Amendment as a powerful reason for this conclusion.16 He emphasized that the right to jury trial in major prosecutions is fundamental to justice and liberty, supported by the progression of history and the deepening realization of procedural protections demanded by human dignity.17 However, Fortas cautioned that the decision should not automatically import all ancillary federal jury rules, such as unanimous verdicts or twelve-person juries, onto the states, as these features are not essential to due process and imposing them would undermine federalism by rigidly requiring uniformity rather than allowing state variations that preserve basic fairness.18
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana and his separate opinion in Cheff v. Schnackenberg.19 He argued that the Court had imposed on the states a rule of procedure that was neither shown to be fundamental to procedural fairness nor part of the originally understood content of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The sole justification was its presence in the Bill of Rights.21
Harlan viewed the extension of this rule to criminal contempt as completing a remarkable circle.22 He noted that the majority invoked Justice Holmes's words against unconstitutional assumptions of power in a manner that could only be attributed to the vagaries of the times without additional justification for the result.23