284 U.S. 421 (1932)
Harry M. Blackmer, a citizen of the United States who removed his residence to Paris, France in 1924, became the subject of two separate contempt proceedings in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia after failing to respond to subpoenas that required him to appear as a witness on behalf of the United States at a criminal trial.1 The subpoenas were issued under the Act of July 3, 1926, addressed to a United States consul, and served personally upon Blackmer in France together with a tender of traveling expenses.2
Upon proof of service and default, the court issued orders to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.3 The court directed seizure of his property within the United States to secure any fine that might be imposed.4 Blackmer did not appear in response to the subpoenas.5
In each proceeding the court imposed a fine of $30,000 with costs to be satisfied out of the seized property, and the two cases were heard together.6 The decrees were affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia at 49 F. (2d) 523, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted writs of certiorari.7
In one proceeding Blackmer had been subpoenaed to attend on April 2, 1928, but the case was continued until April 9, 1928, and the subpoena directed that the witness not depart the court without leave.8 These events set the stage for the constitutional challenges to the statute's validity.9
Whether the Act of July 3, 1926 violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by authorizing United States consuls to serve process on citizens abroad except as permitted by treaty?10
No. Harry M. Blackmer, a United States citizen who moved his residence to Paris, France in 1924, remained subject to the legislative power of the United States by virtue of his citizenship and continuing allegiance.13
The Act of July 3, 1926 authorized issuance of subpoenas addressed to a United States consul for personal service in France together with tender of traveling expenses, and the facts establish that such service occurred in both proceedings.14
Because the obligation to appear is personal and the notice is given directly by the citizen's own government, the method of service raises no question of international law or foreign sovereignty.15
The statutory procedure therefore satisfies due process by providing actual notice and an opportunity to be heard before any penalty is imposed.16
The Act does not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment through its authorization of consular service abroad.17
Whether the Act provides a valid method of acquiring judicial jurisdiction to render personal judgment against an absent citizen and judgment against his property?18
Jurisdiction over an absent citizen is in personam because the citizen is bound to obey applicable United States laws; the statute validly enforces that obligation through subpoena, order to show cause, and provisional seizure of property located in the United States.19
Yes. Blackmer owed the duty to support the administration of justice by appearing when properly summoned, and the two subpoenas were issued after proper showing to the District of Columbia court.20
Upon proof of service and default the court issued orders to show cause and directed seizure of his property within the United States to secure any fine ultimately imposed.21
The seizure was a provisional remedy resting on the validity of the underlying contempt proceeding, and the property was to be held only until final judgment.22
These steps constitute a lawful exercise of judicial jurisdiction over the citizen and his domestic property.23
The Act supplies a valid method of acquiring jurisdiction over an absent citizen and his property.24
Whether the Act requires actual or any other notice to the defendant of the offense or of the Government's claim against his property?25
Due process in a contempt proceeding is satisfied by suitable notice and an adequate opportunity to appear and be heard; the statute meets this requirement through personal service of the subpoena, the subsequent order to show cause, and publication.26
Yes. After Blackmer failed to obey the subpoenas, the court issued orders to show cause that were served personally upon him in France and published in a newspaper of general circulation in the District of Columbia.27
The orders informed him of the charge of contempt arising from his default and of the scheduled hearing at which he could present a defense.28
The same orders directed seizure of his property and thereby gave notice of the government's claim against that property.29
Blackmer therefore received both actual and constructive notice sufficient to satisfy due process.30
The Act requires and provides constitutionally adequate notice of the offense and of the claim against the defendant's property.31
Whether provisions for hearing and judgment in the entire absence of the accused and without his consent violate due process?32
No. Blackmer received personal service of the subpoenas and of the orders to show cause yet chose not to appear.35
The statute permits the court to proceed to hearing and judgment only after proof of service and default and after affording the witness an opportunity to present evidence at the show-cause hearing.36
Because contempt proceedings have long been treated as distinct from ordinary criminal prosecutions, the absence of the contemnor after proper notice does not violate due process.37
The fines were imposed only after the court found the charge sustained upon the record made in the two consolidated cases.38
Provisions allowing hearing and judgment in the absence of a properly notified contemnor do not violate due process.39
Whether the Act is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable?40
A statute that enforces a citizen's duty to appear as a witness by means of subpoena, show-cause order, and seizure of domestic property is reasonable and does not create an unconstitutional classification.41
No. The Act applies uniformly to any citizen abroad whose attendance is desired by the government in a criminal trial and whose default is established by proof of service.42
Blackmer's liability arose solely from his disobedience to lawful process, not from the mere fact that he owned property subject to seizure.43
The provisional seizure pending hearing is a familiar and reasonable device when the defendant is absent, and the statutory maximum fine is calibrated to the importance of securing testimony.44
No arbitrary or capricious classification appears in the statutory scheme or in its application to the facts of these proceedings.45
The Act is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.46
Whether the statute authorizes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?47
A levy upon property of a defaulting witness within the United States, made in the manner provided for execution, is a lawful provisional or final remedy and does not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure.48
No. Upon issuance of each order to show cause the court directed the marshal to seize Blackmer's property located in the United States in the manner prescribed for levies under execution.49
The seizure was expressly authorized by section 5 of the Act and was undertaken only after proof of service and default.50
Such a levy, whether provisional to secure a possible fine or final to satisfy a judgment, falls outside the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment.51
The statute does not authorize an unreasonable search and seizure.52
Whether the statute violates the Sixth Amendment by limiting the availability of the subpoena to the Government and excluding defendants in criminal prosecutions from the right to such a subpoena?53
A recalcitrant witness who has defaulted on a subpoena issued under the Act lacks standing to challenge the statute's alleged limitation of compulsory process to the government alone.54
No. Blackmer was the defaulting witness in two contempt proceedings brought by the United States; he was not a defendant seeking to obtain witnesses in his favor.55
The established facts show that he refused to appear after receiving the subpoenas and therefore stands in the position of a contemnor rather than an accused asserting compulsory-process rights.56
Because he is not a defendant denied the opportunity to secure favorable testimony, he may not raise the Sixth Amendment claim.57
The court therefore need not decide whether the statute in fact restricts access to the subpoena procedure.58
The statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment rights of a defaulting witness in these circumstances.59