136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016)
Brandon Betterman was ordered to appear in court on domestic assault charges but failed to show up and was therefore charged with bail jumping.1 After pleading guilty to the bail-jumping charge, he was jailed for over 14 months awaiting sentence on that conviction.2 The holdup in large part was due to institutional delay: the presentence report took nearly five months to complete, the trial court took several months to deny two presentence motions, and the court was slow in setting a sentencing hearing.3
Betterman was eventually sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, with four of those years suspended.4 Arguing that the 14-month gap between conviction and sentencing violated his speedy trial right, Betterman appealed.5 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, ruling that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to postconviction, presentencing delay.6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among courts over whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to such delay.7 Petitioner Brandon Betterman advanced in this Court only a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim and did not preserve a due process challenge.8
Whether the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee applies once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges?9
No. The Speedy Trial Clause implements the presumption of innocence by preventing undue incarceration prior to trial, minimizing anxiety from public accusation, and limiting prejudice to the defense.12 Brandon Betterman pleaded guilty to the bail-jumping charge after failing to appear on domestic assault charges. He was then jailed for over 14 months awaiting sentence due to institutional delay in completing the presentence report, denying presentence motions, and setting a hearing.13 Upon his guilty plea Betterman stood convicted, terminating the presumption of innocence that the Clause protects.14
The sole remedy of dismissal would constitute an unjustified windfall for postconviction delay rather than addressing sentencing timing.15
The Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas agrees that the Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to sentencing proceedings except perhaps to bifurcated sentencing proceedings where sentencing enhancements operate as functional elements of a greater offense.17 He concurs in reserving judgment on Due Process Clause claims for sentencing delay.18 Betterman’s counsel repeatedly disclaimed any due process challenge in this Court.19
He would not prejudge whether the Barker factors translate to delayed sentencing and notes that states might satisfy due process through procedures such as mandamus or statutes regulating sentencing timing.20
Justice Sotomayor agrees that petitioner cannot bring a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause for delay between his guilty plea and sentencing.21 She emphasizes that the question of the appropriate test for a Due Process Clause challenge to sentencing delay remains open.22 The Barker test captures many concerns in the sentencing delay context, is flexible enough to account for differences from trial delay, and has been adopted by the majority of circuits for that purpose.