260 U.S. 370 (2010)
On January 10, 2000, a shooting occurred outside a mall in Southfield, Michigan, in which Samuel Morris died from multiple gunshot wounds and Frederick France was injured but recovered.1
Van Chester Thompkins was identified as a suspect and fled; he was arrested in Ohio approximately one year later.2 Two Southfield police officers, including Detective Helgert, traveled to Ohio to interrogate Thompkins while he awaited transfer to Michigan.3 The interrogation began around 1:30 p.m. in an 8-by-10-foot room and lasted about three hours, with Thompkins seated in a chair resembling a school desk.4
At the outset, Detective Helgert presented Thompkins with a written Miranda rights form derived from the standard warnings.5 Thompkins read the fifth warning aloud, after which Helgert read the remaining warnings; Thompkins declined to sign the form to acknowledge understanding his rights, though there was conflicting evidence about whether he verbally confirmed understanding.
During the interrogation Thompkins remained largely silent and uncommunicative, giving only occasional one-word answers such as “yeah,” “no,” or “I don’t know,” nodding his head at times, and stating that he did not want a peppermint offered by the officers and that the chair he was sitting in was hard.
Approximately two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, Helgert asked Thompkins whether he prayed to God to forgive him for shooting the boy; Thompkins answered “yes,” made eye contact, and his eyes welled with tears. Thompkins refused to provide a written confession, and the interrogation ended about fifteen minutes later.6
Thompkins was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and firearms-related offenses; he moved to suppress the statements made during the interrogation.7 The trial court denied the suppression motion.8 At trial the prosecution called Eric Purifoy, who had driven the van during the shooting and had been acquitted of murder and assault charges in a prior trial but convicted of firearms offenses; the jury convicted Thompkins on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole.9
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Thompkins’s Miranda and ineffective-assistance claims and affirmed the conviction; the Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Thompkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which denied relief; the Sixth Circuit reversed on both the Miranda and ineffective-assistance claims, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether a suspect must expressly invoke his Miranda right to remain silent?10
A suspect must invoke the Miranda right to remain silent unambiguously.11 This rule is established for the right to counsel in Davis v. United States and extended here.12 Both rights protect against compulsory self-incrimination by requiring interrogation to cease upon invocation.13 An ambiguous statement or no statement allows police to continue questioning.14 The rule produces an objective inquiry that avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to officers.15
No. Thompkins never stated that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police.16 This occurred during the three-hour interrogation in the eight-by-ten-foot room after receiving the full Miranda warnings from Detective Helgert.17 Had Thompkins made either simple unambiguous statement he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning under Michigan v. Mosley.18 Instead he remained largely silent while giving only occasional one-word answers such as yeah no or I do not know and nodding his head at times.19
The state court therefore correctly concluded that Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent.20
Thompkins did not expressly invoke his Miranda right to remain silent so the police were not required to cease questioning.21
Whether the state court unreasonably concluded that Thompkins waived his Miranda right to remain silent under the totality of the circumstances?22
If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and that the accused understood it an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent under North Carolina v. Butler.23 The waiver must be voluntary as the product of a free and deliberate choice.24 It must also be knowing and intelligent with full awareness of the right abandoned and the consequences.25 The prosecution bears the burden to show waiver by a preponderance of the evidence considering the totality of the circumstances.26
No. Detective Helgert administered the complete Miranda warnings at the start of the interrogation in the standard-sized room.27 Thompkins read the fifth warning aloud demonstrating he could read and understand English. Thompkins never claimed he failed to understand the rights.28 He engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver by answering some questions giving one-word responses and making affirmative statements that he did not want a peppermint and that the chair was hard.29
After nearly three hours he answered yes when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for shooting the boy. The interrogation involved no threats physical force or deprivation of food or water.30 The state court reasonably found a knowing and voluntary implied waiver under the totality of the circumstances.31
The state court reasonably concluded that Thompkins waived his Miranda right to remain silent.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Sotomayor dissented arguing that the prosecution failed to carry its heavy burden under Miranda and Butler to show waiver because Thompkins remained almost completely silent and uncommunicative for two hours and forty-five minutes giving only three one-word answers after lengthy interrogation.33 She emphasized that Miranda and Butler establish a presumption against waiver that mere silence or the eventual obtaining of a confession cannot overcome.34 The record here consisting of sporadic nonverbal responses and three yes answers does not evidence a course of conduct indicating waiver.35
Sotomayor would have held the Michigan court's finding objectively unreasonable under AEDPA even without reaching the broader constitutional questions.36
Whether Thompkins's statements during the interrogation were involuntary under the Due Process Clause?37
A suspect's statement is involuntary under the Due Process Clause if the totality of the circumstances shows that his will was overborne.38 Factors to be considered include the length location and continuity of the interrogation and the suspect's maturity education physical condition and mental health.39
No. The interrogation lasted three hours in an eight-by-ten-foot room during the middle of the day.40 There is no evidence that Thompkins was particularly susceptible to coercion or that officers used threats physical force or deprivation.41 Thompkins was not sedated or sleep-deprived and the questioning was not threatening or overbearing.42 The facts that Thompkins was in a police station and initially uncommunicative do not establish that his will was overborne so his statements were voluntary.43
Thompkins's statements were voluntary under the Due Process Clause.44
Whether the prosecutor's closing argument violated due process by commenting on Thompkins's statements?45
A prosecutor's closing argument violates due process if it infringes on the defendant's right to remain silent by inviting the jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence rather than from affirmative statements.46
No. The prosecutor argued that Thompkins's affirmative statement that he prayed to God to forgive him for shooting the boy showed guilt.47 The argument was based on Thompkins's voluntary inculpatory statement not on his earlier silence during the interrogation.48 The prosecutor did not suggest that the jury should infer guilt from Thompkins's failure to speak earlier so there was no due process violation.49
The prosecutor's closing argument did not violate due process.50
Whether Thompkins's counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction regarding an accomplice's prior trial outcome?51
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington.52 Prejudice requires a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different considering the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.53
No. Even assuming deficient performance in failing to request a limiting instruction about Eric Purifoy's prior acquittal on murder and assault charges Thompkins cannot show prejudice.54 The surviving victim Frederick France identified Thompkins as the shooter and a surveillance camera photograph supported the identification.55 A friend testified that Thompkins confessed and evidence corroborated that Thompkins stripped and abandoned the van after the shooting.56 The jury was instructed to assess Purifoy's credibility and there was ample other evidence of guilt so it is not reasonably likely that the limiting instruction would have changed the outcome.57
Thompkins cannot show prejudice from any deficient performance by counsel.58