486 U.S. 888 (1988)
In 1974, Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., agreed with Bendix Autolite Corporation to deliver and install a boiler system at a Bendix facility in Fostoria, Ohio.1 Bendix is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio, while Midwesco is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois.2 Bendix became dissatisfied with the work, claiming that the boiler system had been installed improperly and that it was insufficient to produce the quantity of steam specified in the contract.3
This diversity action was filed against Midwesco in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 1980.4 When Midwesco asserted the Ohio statute of limitations as a defense, Bendix responded that the statutory period had not elapsed because under Ohio law the running of the time is suspended, or tolled, for claims against entities that are not within the State and have not designated an agent for service of process.5 Midwesco replied that this tolling provision violated both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
The District Court dismissed the action, finding that the Ohio tolling statute constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.7 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Ohio statute constituted discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause because it required a foreign corporation to choose between exposing itself to personal jurisdiction in state courts by complying with the tolling statute, or, by refusing to comply, to remain liable in perpetuity for all lawsuits containing state causes of action filed against it in the State.8 Bendix appealed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Ohio tolling statute in 1987.9
Whether the Ohio statute tolling the statute of limitations for foreign corporations that have not appointed an agent for service of process violates the Commerce Clause?10
Where the burden of a state regulation falls on interstate commerce, restricting its flow in a manner not applicable to local business and trade, there may be either a discrimination that renders the regulation invalid without more, or cause to weigh and assess the State’s putative interests against the interstate restraints to determine if the burden imposed is an unreasonable one. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 578-579 (1986).11
Yes. The Ohio tolling statute places a significant burden on interstate commerce.12 It forces a foreign corporation such as Midwesco to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio.13 Midwesco must also subject itself to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts to gain the protection of the limitations period.14 Midwesco has no corporate office in Ohio, is not registered to do business there, and has not appointed an agent for service of process in the State.15 The Ohio long-arm statute already permitted service on Midwesco throughout the period of limitations.16 Yet the tolling statute subjects the activities of foreign and domestic corporations to inconsistent regulations.17
This burden exceeds any local interest the state might advance.18 Although serving foreign corporate defendants may be more arduous than serving domestic corporations, state interests that are legitimate for equal protection or due process purposes may be insufficient to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny.19 The statute therefore violates the Commerce Clause.20
The Ohio tolling statute violates the Commerce Clause.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.22 He would abandon the balancing approach to negative Commerce Clause cases.23 He would leave essentially legislative judgments to Congress because weighing governmental interests of a State against the needs of interstate commerce is a task squarely within the responsibility of Congress.24 The Ohio tolling statute is on its face discriminatory because it applies only to out-of-state corporations.25
That facial discrimination cannot be justified on the basis that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.26 A tolling statute that operated only against persons beyond the reach of Ohio's long-arm statute would be narrowly tailored to advance the legitimate purpose of preserving claims.27
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.28 He observed that this case arises because of two peculiar rules of Ohio law.29 Even though a foreign corporation may be subject to process under the state long-arm statute, it is nonetheless not present in the State for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.30
In addition, a foreign corporation installing machinery or equipment sold by it in interstate commerce is not required to appoint a statutory agent before transacting business in Ohio.31 Midwesco's installation of the boiler system constituted intrastate commerce, and Ohio could require licensure when a foreign corporation engages in intrastate commerce.32 Because Midwesco's immunity from the appointment requirement arose from an Ohio statute rather than any federal constitutional right, Ohio could treat Midwesco as it would treat any other entity that has done intrastate business, incurred liability, and thereafter withdrawn from the state.33
He saw no discrimination against interstate commerce and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.34
Whether the Ohio tolling statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?35
A state statute that conditions the availability of a statute of limitations defense on a foreign corporation's consent to general jurisdiction may raise due process concerns if it forces submission to jurisdiction without minimum contacts.36
No. The Supreme Court did not reach or decide the Due Process Clause issue.37 Midwesco replied that the tolling provision violated both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court resolved the case solely under the Commerce Clause after finding the tolling statute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.38
The Court did not decide whether the Ohio tolling statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.39