544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)
Twenty-nine Texas peanut farmers sued Dow Agrosciences LLC after their crops suffered severe damage from the pesticide Strongarm during the 2000 growing season.1 The Environmental Protection Agency had conditionally registered Strongarm on March 8, 2000, allowing Dow to market it in time for the typical May 1 planting date in Texas.2 Dow's label stated that use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas where peanuts are grown, and its agents made similar sales representations to the farmers whose soils had pH levels of 7.2 or higher.3
The farmers applied the pesticide, which damaged their peanut crops and failed to control weeds.4 They reported the problems to Dow, prompting the company to send experts to inspect the fields.5 Before the 2001 season, Dow reregistered Strongarm with a supplemental label approved for distribution only in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas that included a warning against application to soils with a pH of 7.2 or greater.6
Following unsuccessful negotiations, the farmers gave notice of intent to sue under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act.7 Dow filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court asserting that the claims were preempted by FIFRA.8 The farmers then brought counterclaims for strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas DTPA.9
The district court granted Dow's motion for summary judgment, dismissing most claims as expressly preempted.10 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that success on the claims would induce Dow to alter its label.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with decisions from other courts.12
Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act pre-empts the petitioners' state-law claims for damages?13
Under 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), a State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under FIFRA.14 A state rule is preempted only if it is a requirement for labeling or packaging and imposes a standard in addition to or different from FIFRA's.15
No. The farmers' claims for defective design, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty do not qualify as requirements for labeling or packaging because they concern the product's design, testing procedures, and contractual commitments rather than mandating any particular label content or wording, as shown by the established facts that the claims arose from Strongarm's performance on high-pH soils after the EPA's conditional registration and the original label's broad recommendation for use in all peanut-growing areas.16 The fraud and failure-to-warn claims may survive if they parallel FIFRA's misbranding standards prohibiting false or misleading statements and inadequate warnings.17
FIFRA does not preempt the design, testing, manufacture, and warranty claims, and the fraud and failure-to-warn claims survive preemption to the extent they are equivalent to FIFRA requirements; the case is remanded for that determination.18
Whether the term 'requirements' in 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) includes common-law duties?19
The term 'requirements' in § 136v(b) reaches beyond positive enactments such as statutes and regulations to embrace common-law duties, consistent with the interpretation of similar language in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.20
Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that common-law duties qualify as requirements, yet this inclusion does not automatically preempt the farmers' claims because the analysis must still examine whether each duty targets labeling or packaging and diverges from FIFRA standards, as applied to the facts of the Texas peanut farmers' counterclaims for strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and Texas DTPA violations following crop damage from Strongarm.21
The term 'requirements' includes common-law duties.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas agreed that the term requirements in section 136v(b) includes common-law duties for labeling or packaging.23 He emphasized that States may impose liability only when predicated on a violation of federal standards set forth in FIFRA and EPA regulations, but may not impose liability based on distinct state standards of care.24 Under his view, section 136v(b) permits States to add remedies but not to alter the substantive rules governing liability for labeling.25
He stressed that a state cause of action attaching liability to label statements not producing liability under FIFRA adds a supplemental requirement and is preempted.
Whether state common-law claims for defective design, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty qualify as requirements for labeling or packaging under FIFRA?26
Rules that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe products, to use due care in conducting appropriate testing, to market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their express warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do not qualify as requirements for labeling or packaging because none of these rules requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular way.27
No. The farmers' claims for defective design, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty do not impose any obligation on Dow to alter the Strongarm label or packaging, as the established facts demonstrate that these claims focus on the pesticide's suitability for high-pH soils in western Texas and the contractual warranty on the label rather than dictating specific label language or format.28 An effects-based inducement test that would preempt any claim potentially motivating a label change finds no support in the statutory text and would improperly reach even genuine design defect claims that Dow concedes are not preempted.29
These claims do not qualify as requirements for labeling or packaging and therefore are not preempted by FIFRA.30
Whether fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims are pre-empted by FIFRA when they parallel the statute's misbranding provisions?31
A state-law labeling requirement is not preempted by § 136v(b) if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA's misbranding provisions that prohibit false or misleading statements and require adequate instructions and warnings; state requirements must be measured against relevant EPA regulations that give content to those standards.32
No. The farmers' fraud claims premised on the Strongarm label's statement recommending use in all peanut-growing areas and the failure-to-warn allegations are not preempted if the Texas common-law duties are equivalent to FIFRA's prohibition on misbranding under 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(A), (F), and (G), as the established facts show the original label lacked any pH restriction while a later supplemental label added the warning for Texas soils; the Court of Appeals must determine equivalence on remand, including whether the element of falsity under Texas fraud law matches FIFRA's standard.33
Fraud and failure-to-warn claims are not preempted to the extent they impose requirements equivalent to FIFRA's misbranding standards.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer stressed the practical importance of measuring state-law requirements against relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA's misbranding standards.35 He noted that the EPA possesses legal authority to promulgate rules and determine their preemptive effect in light of the agency's special understanding of whether state liability rules mirror or distort federal requirements.36 In his view, the EPA is often better positioned than courts to decide whether general state tort rules help expose new dangers or instead produce a counterproductive crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements.37
Emphasizing the agency's role in overseeing FIFRA's implementation, he joined the Court's opinion.38
Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas would remand the breach-of-warranty claims for preemption analysis because Texas warranty law is preempted to the extent it imposes liability for label statements where FIFRA would not.39 He also concluded that the Texas DTPA claim, which includes allegations of false or misleading representations on the label, should be remanded in full rather than preserved to the extent it rests on breach of warranty.40 Under his approach, any state cause of action that attaches liability to label statements not producing liability under FIFRA adds a supplemental requirement and is preempted.41