337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975)
Plaintiff Lewis, a stockholder of Allied Artists Pictures Corporation, a Delaware corporation, originally brought suit to have the 1973 election of directors declared illegal and invalid and to have a master appointed to conduct a new election pursuant to 8 Del. C. §§ 225 and 227.1 He later filed a second action seeking the same relief as to the 1974 election of directors, and the two causes were consolidated for decision based upon the cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment.2 Both sides agree that there is no material dispute of fact and that the matter is proper for summary judgment.3
Allied was originally started in the mid-1930s as Sterling Pictures Corporation and later changed its name to Monogram Films before adopting its present name in the early 1950s.4 In 1954, needing capital, Allied amended its certificate of incorporation to permit issuance of 150,000 shares of preferred stock at $10 par value with dividends payable quarterly on a cumulative basis.5 The amendment provided that if six or more quarterly dividends on the preferred stock are in default, the preferred stockholders voting as a class shall have the right to elect a majority of the directors until all dividends in default are paid.6 The amendment also required creation of a sinking fund into which ten percent of the excess of consolidated net earnings over preferred dividend requirements would be set aside each year for redemption of preferred stock at $10.50 per share.7
Regular quarterly dividends were paid on the preferred stock through March 30, 1963.8 Thereafter Allied suffered losses that impaired the capital represented by the preferred stock, prohibiting dividend payments under 8 Del.C. § 170.9 By September 1964 the corporation was in default on six quarterly dividends, triggering the preferred stockholders' right to elect a majority of the board, which they have exercised ever since.10 As of the December 11, 1973 election, Kalvex, Inc. owned 52 percent of the outstanding preferred stock while holding only 625 shares of Allied's 1,500,000 shares of common stock.11 Kalvex has since acquired additional common shares or convertible securities.12 Officers and directors of Allied overlap substantially with those of Kalvex, and for fiscal 1973 the officers and directors of Allied as a group received $402,088 in compensation.13
In 1964 Allied was assessed a $1,400,000 tax deficiency by the Internal Revenue Service and entered an agreement to pay it over time on the condition that no dividends would be paid without IRS consent until the deficiency was satisfied.14 Allied's financial condition fluctuated through 1974, with net losses in most years.15 In 1972 Allied acquired rights to, produced, and distributed the film Cabaret, which became its largest grossing film to that point, followed by a $7,000,000 commitment to Papillon, which proved even more successful.16 For fiscal 1973 Allied had net income in excess of $1,400,000 plus a $2,000,000 tax carry-over.17 Prior to the 1973 election the IRS balance owed was some $249,000, and as of the 1974 election one final payment remained.18 Prior to the 1973 election Allied was in default on forty-three quarterly preferred dividends totaling more than $270,000; by the 1974 election the arrearages exceeded $280,000.19
Plaintiff contends that in one or more years since the preferred stockholders gained control, the financial statements showed either net income or capital surplus larger than the accumulated arrearages, so the board had a duty to pay the arrearages and the IRS balance to return control to the common stockholders at the next annual election.20 Plaintiff seeks an order for a new election at which the board would be elected by the common stockholders.21
Whether the board of directors elected by the preferred stockholders has wrongfully perpetuated its control by refusing to pay accumulated preferred dividend arrearages when funds became legally available?22
The determination as to when and in what amounts a corporation may prudently distribute its assets by way of dividends rests in the honest discretion of the directors in the performance of this fiduciary duty.23 Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown.24
No. When the yearly hit-and-miss financial history of Allied from 1964 through 1974 is considered along with the Internal Revenue obligation during the same time span, the board has not been guilty of perpetuating itself in office by wrongfully refusing to apply corporate funds to the liquidation of the preferred dividend arrearages and the accelerated payment of the Internal Revenue debt.25 The mere existence of a legal source from which payment could be made does not prove fraud or gross abuse of discretion.
The preferred board did not wrongfully perpetuate its control by refusing to pay the arrearages.26
Whether the 1973 and 1974 elections of directors should be declared invalid and a new election ordered because the preferred board allegedly failed to pay dividend arrearages and the IRS obligation to restore control to the common stockholders?27
The determination as to when and in what amounts a corporation may prudently distribute its assets by way of dividends rests in the honest discretion of the directors in the performance of this fiduciary duty. Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown.
No. There is no basis on the record before the court to set aside the 1974 annual election and to order a new one through a master appointed by the court.28 The financial history shows no fraud or gross abuse of discretion by the preferred board in refusing to pay arrearages or accelerate the IRS debt payment, even though funds existed in some years.
The 1973 and 1974 elections should not be declared invalid and no new election should be ordered.29
Whether the preferred board's refusal to pay dividends or make sinking fund contributions constitutes fraud or gross abuse of discretion requiring court intervention?30
The determination as to when and in what amounts a corporation may prudently distribute its assets by way of dividends rests in the honest discretion of the directors in the performance of this fiduciary duty. Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown.
No. The mere existence of a legal source from which payment could be made, standing alone, does not prove either fraud or gross abuse of discretion. The legal advice and decision to defer annual contributions to the sinking fund pending rectification of Allied's financial position was given and made prior to the election of the first board of directors by the preferred shareholders, and even full contributions would not have redeemed all preferred stock by the election dates.
The preferred board's refusal to pay dividends or make sinking fund contributions does not constitute fraud or gross abuse of discretion requiring court intervention.31