412 U.S. 837 (1973)
In June and July 1971, petitioner James Edward Barnes opened a checking account under the name Clarence Smith.1
He later deposited four United States Treasury checks totaling over $800 into that account.2 The checks had been mailed by the United States Disbursing Office in San Francisco on July 1 and July 3 to four individuals: Nettie Lewis, Albert Young, Arthur Salazar, and Mary Hernandez.3
Each check bore endorsements in the payees' names and a second endorsement by Clarence Smith.4 At trial in the United States District Court, the four payees testified that they had never received, endorsed, or authorized endorsement of the checks.5
A government handwriting expert testified that Barnes had made the Clarence Smith endorsements on all four checks and the payees' signatures on two of them.6 A postal inspector testified regarding statements Barnes made after his arrest, in which Barnes claimed he received the checks from door-to-door furniture salespeople, that the checks were already signed when he received them, and that he could not identify the salespeople or provide records of the transactions.7
Barnes did not testify at trial.8 The District Court instructed the jury that possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, ordinarily permits an inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen.9
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all six counts, and the court imposed concurrent three-year prison sentences.10 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions on the possession counts.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.12
Whether the trial court's instruction permitting the jury to infer from unexplained possession of recently stolen mail that the defendant knew the mail was stolen comports with due process?13
What has been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.14
Yes. The evidence established that petitioner possessed recently stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not know, and it provided no plausible explanation for such possession consistent with innocence.15 On the basis of this evidence alone common sense and experience tell us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen.16 Such evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew the checks were stolen.17
Since the inference thus satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard, the most stringent standard the Court has applied in judging permissive criminal law inferences, the instruction satisfies the requirements of due process.18
The trial court's instruction comports with due process.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the inference permits conviction without any evidence on the essential element that the checks were stolen from the mails.20 This violates the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime.21 He argued that without statistics showing the likelihood that stolen checks come from the mails, the inference amounts to impermissible speculation.22
The inference shifts the burden to the defendant in a manner that dilutes the presumption of innocence and the protections of the Bill of Rights.23
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the instruction violated the Due Process Clause because it permitted the jury to convict even though the actual evidence bearing on knowledge may have been insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.24
He emphasized that unlike the heroin inference in Turner, common sense does not permit the conclusion that the possessor of stolen Treasury checks inevitably knew they were stolen.25 The instruction therefore relieved the Government of its burden under Winship.26
Whether the permissive inference infringes the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination?27
The Court has twice rejected this argument, and we find no reason to re-examine the issue at length.28 The trial court specifically instructed the jury that petitioner had a constitutional right not to take the witness stand and that possession could be satisfactorily explained by evidence independent of petitioner's testimony.29 Introduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime increases the pressure on him to testify.30 The mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination.31
No. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that petitioner had a constitutional right not to take the witness stand and that possession could be satisfactorily explained by evidence independent of petitioner's testimony.32 The instruction therefore does not compel the defendant to testify or penalize the exercise of the privilege.33
The permissive inference does not infringe the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.34
Whether conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1708 requires proof that the defendant knew the property was stolen from the mails?35
Petitioner further challenges his conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that he knew the checks were stolen from the mails.36 He contends that 18 U.S.C. § 1708 requires knowledge not only that the checks were stolen, but specifically that they were stolen from the mails.37 The legislative history of the statute conclusively refutes this argument and the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have uniformly interpreted the statute to require only knowledge that the property was stolen.3839
No. The legislative history of the statute conclusively refutes the argument that knowledge the property was stolen from the mails is required.40 The courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have uniformly interpreted the statute to require only knowledge that the property was stolen.
Conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1708 does not require proof that the defendant knew the property was stolen from the mails.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that without a nexus with the mails there is no federal offense.42 Possession of stolen property is traditionally under our federal system a local law question.43 It becomes a federal concern in the present case only if the mail was implicated.44 The inference that possession of a stolen check allows a conclusion that the accused knew the check was stolen from the mails is irrational.45
He argued that the use of the presumption shifts the burden by arbitrarily making one fact the occasion of casting on the defendant the obligation of exculpation, contrary to Tot and Winship.46 This allows conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the federal offense.47