407 U.S. 514 (1972)
On July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by intruders wielding an iron tire tool.1 Two suspects, Silas Manning and Willie Barker, the petitioner, were arrested shortly thereafter.2 The grand jury indicted them on September 15.3 Counsel was appointed on September 17, and Barker’s trial was set for October 21.4
The Commonwealth had a stronger case against Manning and believed that Barker could not be convicted unless Manning testified against him.5 Accordingly, on October 23, the day Silas Manning was brought to trial, the Commonwealth sought and obtained the first of what was to be a series of 16 continuances of Barker’s trial.6 Barker made no objection.7 Manning’s first trial ended in a hung jury.8 A second trial resulted in a conviction that the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed because of evidence obtained by an illegal search.9 At his third trial Manning was again convicted, and the Court of Appeals again reversed because the trial court had not granted a change of venue.10 A fourth trial resulted in a hung jury.11 After five trials Manning was convicted in March 1962 of murdering one victim, and after a sixth trial in December 1962 he was convicted of murdering the other.12
The Christian County Circuit Court holds three terms each year in February, June, and September.13 Barker’s initial trial was to take place in the September term of 1958.14 The first continuance postponed it until the February 1959 term.15 Every term thereafter for as long as the Manning prosecutions were in process, the Commonwealth routinely moved to continue Barker’s case to the next term.16 Barker spent 10 months in jail before obtaining his release by posting a $5,000 bond in September 1959.17 He thereafter remained free in the community until his trial.18 Barker made no objection through counsel to the first 11 continuances.19
When on February 12, 1962, the Commonwealth moved for the twelfth time to continue the case, Barker’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.20 The motion was denied and the continuance was granted.21 The Commonwealth was granted further continuances in June and September 1962 to which Barker did not object.22 In February 1963 the Commonwealth moved to set Barker’s trial for March 19.23 On the scheduled date it moved for a continuance until the June term because of the illness of the ex-sheriff who was the chief investigating officer.24 Barker objected unsuccessfully.25 The witness remained unable to testify in June, and the trial was continued until the September term over Barker’s objection.26 The final trial date was set for October 9, 1963.27 On that date Barker again moved to dismiss the indictment, specifying that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.28 The motion was denied, the trial commenced with Manning as the chief prosecution witness, and Barker was convicted and given a life sentence.29
Barker appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which affirmed.30 In February 1970 Barker petitioned for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.31 The District Court rejected the petition.32 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.33 The Supreme Court granted Barker’s petition for certiorari.34
Whether the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period?35
The Court finds no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.36
No. The Court reasoned that a fixed time period would require legislative or rulemaking activity rather than the adjudicative process to which the Court confines its efforts.37 In this case the delay exceeded five years with sixteen continuances granted while Manning was tried six times, yet the Court declined to impose any numerical limit and instead required case-by-case evaluation under a balancing test.38
The Constitution does not require a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period.39
Whether the demand-waiver doctrine applies to speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment?40
The demand-waiver doctrine is rejected because it presumes waiver of a fundamental right from inaction and is inconsistent with the Court's pronouncements that waiver requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right.41
No. The Court held that a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial and that the State bears the primary burden.42 In this case Barker filed no objection to the first eleven continuances.43 He moved to dismiss only on the twelfth continuance in February 1962.44 Yet the Court still considered the full period of delay rather than deeming the right waived for the preceding years.45
The demand-waiver doctrine does not apply to speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment.46
Whether the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant must be balanced to determine a speedy trial violation?47
A balancing test must be applied in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, considering the four factors of length of delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant.48
Yes. The Court identified the four factors as related and to be considered together with other relevant circumstances rather than as necessary or sufficient conditions by themselves.49 In this case the extraordinary length of delay and the Commonwealth's pursuit of Manning's testimony were weighed against Barker's minimal objection until 1962 and the absence of serious prejudice shown at trial.50
The length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant must be balanced to determine a speedy trial violation.51
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred to emphasize that the speedy trial guarantee protects against inordinate delay that interferes with liberty and causes anxiety even apart from prejudice to the defense on the merits.52 He observed that defendants who desire an early trial should receive it within a reasonable time.53 Crowded dockets alone cannot justify delay in run-of-the-mill cases.54
The result would have been otherwise had Barker not so clearly acquiesced in the major delays.55 The personal interests in prompt trial should prevail unless special circumstances outweigh them.56
Whether the delay between arrest and trial in this case violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial?57
Application of the balancing test to the particular facts determines whether the right has been violated, with none of the four factors being talismanic.58
No. The length of delay was extraordinary and only seven months were justified by the ex-sheriff's illness, yet prejudice was minimal because no defense witnesses became unavailable and only minor memory lapses occurred.59 Barker did not want a speedy trial, as shown by his failure to object for more than three years while gambling on Manning's acquittal, and he began objecting only after Manning's convictions became final.60
The delay between arrest and trial in this case did not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial.61