21 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1927)
In June 1925, Bernard M. Reaves arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, and negotiated with A. G. Bailey, a local manager for Castner, Curran & Bullitt, to charter a boat for coast-wise trade.1 On July 18, 1925, Reaves chartered the steamship Corsica for six months, took possession of the vessel, and had it loaded with coal. Shortly after loading and just before departure from the coal dock, defendant Charles M. Baker came aboard and assumed command as master, with the vessel's papers listing Baker as captain and Reaves as first officer, although Artie Baker later served as first mate on the voyage.2
The Corsica proceeded to Bath, Maine, where the coal cargo was discharged. Reaves then joined the vessel accompanied by two strangers. After leaving Bath, officers and members of the crew were summoned to the captain's room, where in the presence of Baker, Reaves, and the two strangers they were informed that the boat would be used for rum running in violation of the prohibition laws and were offered bonuses to participate.3 The vessel searched for a rum ship, stopped briefly in Boston, located the ship off the coast of Nova Scotia, loaded 4,600 cases of liquor, and unloaded the cargo over two nights at Oyster Bay, New York.4
The Corsica returned to Newport News on August 16, 1925, where it was seized by agents of the owners. A search of the vessel revealed 16 quarts of liquor as well as numerous broken cases and bottle wrappings.5 In May 1926, Reaves, Baker, and Artie Baker were jointly indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on a charge of conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act under section 37 of the Criminal Code. Artie Baker was not in custody. Reaves and Baker were tried on May 4, 1926, after an indictment returned the previous day to correct errors in a prior indictment to which Baker had already entered an appearance. No evidence was offered on behalf of the defendants, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Baker, who was sentenced and then sued out a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals.6
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance?7
Motions for a continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and their denial constitutes ordinarily no ground for the reversal of a judgment unless it be clearly shown that such discretion has been abused.8
No. The indictment returned on May 3, 1926 corrected errors in a prior indictment charging substantially the same offense to which the defendant had already entered an appearance with notice to prepare for trial.9 The case was called for trial the following day on May 4, 1926.10 No other grounds for a continuance were presented to the court.11 The trial court acted within its discretion when it denied the motion because the defendant had received prior notice and the corrected indictment did not introduce new charges requiring additional preparation time.12
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance.13
Whether the trial court erred in permitting the government to present its evidence in the sequence it chose?14
The order in which testimony shall be admitted is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and a conspiracy is often proved by the overt act.15
No. The government presented its evidence in chronological order beginning with the negotiations for the charter of the Corsica in June 1925 and ending with the vessel's seizure upon return to Newport News on August 16, 1925.16 This sequence followed the natural progression of events from the initial chartering through the loading of coal, the meeting after leaving Bath, the acquisition of the liquor cargo off Nova Scotia, the unloading at Oyster Bay, and the final seizure.17 The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing this orderly presentation because the evidence traced the formation and execution of the conspiracy without confusion or prejudice to the defendant.18
The trial court did not err in permitting the government to present its evidence in the sequence it chose.19
Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the profitability of legitimate coastwise trade, coal purchase negotiations, the defendant's statements to a Department of Justice agent, and liquor found aboard the vessel upon seizure?20
Evidence is admissible when it tends to prove the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's knowing participation, or the truth of statements made by government witnesses, provided the defendant's statements are voluntary and not induced by threats or promises.21
No. The evidence concerning whether the boat could have been operated profitably in legitimate coastwise trade was a proper inquiry because it tended to show the vessel was chartered for an unlawful purpose rather than legitimate trade.22 The evidence of negotiations with Reaves for the purchase of coal for the rum-running voyage was likewise admissible as it directly related to preparation for the illegal enterprise.23 The conversation between the defendant and Crawford, the agent of the Department of Justice, was properly admitted because the statements were purely voluntary admissions tending to prove guilt and were not induced by threats or promises.24 Finally, the evidence of the 16 quarts of liquor found aboard the Corsica upon seizure, along with broken cases and wrappings, was admissible because it corroborated the testimony regarding the handling of the 4,600 cases of liquor during the voyage.25
The trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence.26
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support denial of the motions for a directed verdict of not guilty?27
If the conspiracy is entered into within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the indictment will lie there even if the overt act was committed elsewhere, and one who joins a conspiracy after its formation by contributing to its carrying out with knowledge thereof becomes liable as a party.28
Yes. The evidence showed that the defendant assumed command of the Corsica as master in Norfolk shortly after it was chartered by Reaves, that the vessel's papers listed him as captain, and that he was present when Reaves informed the crew the boat would be used for rum running.2930 The defendant took no steps to protest or withdraw from the enterprise despite his near-supreme authority over the vessel on the high seas.31 The six-month charter period, the inability of the vessel to operate profitably in legitimate trade, the loading of 4,600 cases of liquor, the unloading over two nights at Oyster Bay, and the return to Newport News with remaining liquor aboard all supported the existence of a continuing conspiracy with an overt act in the Eastern District of Virginia.32
The evidence was therefore sufficient to connect the defendant to the conspiracy either at its inception or upon his knowing joinder and to sustain venue and the denial of the motions for a directed verdict.33
The evidence was sufficient to support denial of the motions for a directed verdict of not guilty.34
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendant's requested jury instruction No. 10 concerning the presumption of innocence and burden of proof?35
Errors in the instructions should be pointed out specifically before the jury retires.36 This gives the court an opportunity of correcting its mistake or oversight.37 A general exception to the refusal of a body of requested instructions is insufficient to compel examination of each separate instruction.38
No. The defendant requested instruction No. 10 on the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof but failed to call the trial court's specific attention to the omission of that instruction after the charge was given.39 Although the defendant took several specific exceptions at the conclusion of the judge's charge, no mention was made of instruction No. 10, and the judge's attention was never directed to the precise point. Had the omission been specifically noted, the court would have given the instruction either in the requested form or in substance.40 Because the exception was not specific, the point cannot be raised on appeal.41
The trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested jury instruction No. 10.42