380 U.S. 545, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)
The petitioner, R. Wright Armstrong, Jr., and his wife were divorced by a Texas court in 1959. Custody of their only child, Molly Page Armstrong, was awarded to the mother. The petitioner was granted visitation privileges at reasonable times and ordered to pay fifty dollars monthly for support.1 In 1960 the mother married Salvatore E. Manzo. Two years later the Manzos filed a petition for adoption in the District Court of El Paso County, Texas, seeking to make Salvatore Manzo the legal father of the child.2
Prior to filing the adoption petition, Mrs. Manzo filed an affidavit in the juvenile court alleging that the petitioner had failed to contribute to the support of Molly Page Armstrong for a period in excess of two years. No notice was given to the petitioner although the Manzos knew his precise whereabouts in Fort Worth, Texas.3 On the basis of the affidavit and without a hearing, the juvenile court judge issued his consent to the adoption. The adoption petition alleged that consent of the natural father was not necessary on grounds of nonsupport and that the juvenile judge had consented in writing. No notice of any kind was given to the petitioner of the filing or pendency of this petition.4
An investigator appointed by the court made a detailed written report recommending the adoption. A few weeks later the adoption decree was entered. The decree provided that all legal relationship and rights between the child and the natural father would cease. The child would thereafter be known as Molly Page Manzo.5 During this entire period the petitioner had no inkling of the pendency of these proceedings. On the day the decree was entered, Salvatore Manzo wrote to the petitioner's father announcing completion of the court action to adopt the child and change her name.6
The petitioner promptly filed a motion in the District Court asking that the adoption decree be set aside and a new trial granted on the ground that he had been given no notice of the adoption proceedings.7 The court set a date for hearing on the motion. At that hearing the petitioner introduced evidence through witnesses and by depositions in an effort to show that he had not failed to contribute to his daughter's support commensurate with his financial ability.8 At the conclusion of the hearing the court entered an order denying the motion and providing that the adoption decree was in all things confirmed.9 The petitioner appealed to the Texas court of civil appeals, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the Supreme Court of Texas refused an application for writ of error.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether failure to notify the petitioner of the pendency of the adoption proceedings deprived him of due process of law so as to render the adoption decree constitutionally invalid?12
The Due Process Clause requires that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.13 This includes notice reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.14
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Mrs. Manzo filed an affidavit in juvenile court alleging nonsupport without any notice to the petitioner despite the Manzos' knowledge of his precise location in Fort Worth. The juvenile court issued consent without a hearing of any kind.15 The adoption petition was then filed in district court with no notice given to the petitioner of its filing or pendency.
An investigator's report led to entry of a final decree permanently terminating all legal relationship and rights between the petitioner and his daughter.16 These steps occurred over an extended period during which the petitioner had not the slightest inkling of the proceedings, directly violating the fundamental requirement that notice precede any adjudication that works a permanent deprivation of parenthood.17
The absence of any notice therefore deprived the petitioner of due process and rendered the adoption decree constitutionally invalid.18
Whether the subsequent hearing on the petitioner’s motion to set aside the decree served to cure its constitutional invalidity?19
A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. This opportunity can be fully accorded only by granting a motion to set aside the decree and considering the case anew so as to restore the party to the position occupied had due process been accorded in the first place.20
No. The established facts show that after the decree was entered the petitioner filed a motion to set it aside, prompting a hearing at which he bore the burden of affirmatively introducing evidence through witnesses and depositions to prove he had contributed support commensurate with his financial ability.21 In contrast, timely notice would have required the Manzos as moving parties to shoulder the burden of proving nonsupport and all other requisites for adoption, with no adverse decree already in place.22
The record confirms that the petitioner was forced to overcome findings made by both the juvenile court and the adoption court. Burdens that would not have been imposed had notice been given and that are decisive of outcome in such proceedings.23
The subsequent hearing therefore did not cure the constitutional invalidity of the adoption decree.24