520 U.S. 43 (1997)
In November 1988 Arizona voters passed by a one-percentage-point margin a ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution effective December 5, 1988.1
The measure declared English the official language of the state and required the state and all political subdivisions to act in English except in specified circumstances.2 It also authorized any person residing or doing business in Arizona to sue in state court to enforce the article.3
Two days after the initiative passed, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, a bilingual insurance claims manager in the Arizona Department of Administration, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the State of Arizona, Governor Rose Mofford, Attorney General Robert K. Corbin, and Department Director Catherine Eden.4
Yniguez invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Title VI.5 She sought declaratory and injunctive relief plus fees but did not sue as a class representative.6
On January 24, 1989 the Attorney General issued Opinion No. 189-009 construing Article XXVIII to require only official governmental acts to be performed in English while permitting other languages when reasonably necessary to deliver services.7
Two weeks later the parties filed a statement of stipulated facts that included the Governor’s intention to comply with the measure and the parties’ agreement that Yniguez’s use of Spanish enhanced efficient state operations.8 The stipulation also noted that no supervisor had directed Yniguez to stop using Spanish.9
The district court dismissed the State on Eleventh Amendment grounds and dismissed the Attorney General and Director as defendants.10 On February 6, 1990 it declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional as overbroad while denying injunctive relief.11 Yniguez resigned from state employment effective April 25, 1990 to accept private-sector work.12
After judgment, Arizonans for Official English and its chairman Robert D. Park moved to intervene to appeal.13 The Attorney General moved to intervene and to certify the state-law question to the Arizona Supreme Court.14 The district court denied all post-judgment motions.15
The Ninth Circuit permitted AOE and Park to appeal in 1991.16 It allowed the case to proceed after Yniguez’s resignation on a nominal-damages theory.17 The court affirmed the declaration of unconstitutionality in 1994 and reinstated that judgment en banc in 1995 while directing an award of one dollar in damages. AOE and Park then petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in 1996.18
Whether Yniguez maintained a live case or controversy after resigning from state employment?19
To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.20
No. Yniguez left her state job in April 1990 to take up employment in the private sector, where her speech was not governed by Article XXVIII. At that point, it became plain that she lacked a still vital claim for prospective relief.21 The Ninth Circuit attempted to save the case by reading a plea for nominal damages into the complaint, but that claim was nonexistent because section 1983 actions do not lie against a State.22
Yniguez did not maintain a live case or controversy after her resignation from state employment.23
Whether the sponsor committee Arizonans for Official English and its chairman had Article III standing to appeal as defending parties?24
Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess a direct stake in the outcome.25
No. AOE and Park are not elected representatives, and no Arizona law appoints initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend the constitutionality of initiatives.26 The requisite concrete injury to AOE members is not apparent because as nonparties in the District Court they were not bound by the judgment for Yniguez.27
The sponsor committee Arizonans for Official English and its chairman did not have Article III standing to appeal as defending parties.28
Whether the district court and Ninth Circuit should have certified the proper construction of Article XXVIII to the Arizona Supreme Court?29
Through certification of novel or unsettled questions of state law for authoritative answers by a State's highest court, a federal court may save time, energy, and resources and help build a cooperative judicial federalism.30
Yes. The District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled out certification primarily because they believed Article XXVIII was not fairly subject to a limiting construction.31 The assurance with which the lower courts reached that judgment is all the more puzzling in view of the position the initiative sponsors advanced before this Court on the meaning of Article XXVIII.32 Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State's law.33
The district court and Ninth Circuit should have certified the proper construction of Article XXVIII to the Arizona Supreme Court.34
Whether a claim for nominal damages could revive the action after the request for prospective relief became moot?35
No. Yniguez's complaint rested on 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Although Governor Mofford in her official capacity was the sole defendant against whom the District Court's February 1990 declaratory judgment ran, the Ninth Circuit held the State answerable for the nominal damages Yniguez requested on appeal.38 The barrier was not Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the State could waive.39 The stopper was that section 1983 creates no remedy against a State.
A claim for nominal damages could not revive the action after the request for prospective relief became moot.40
Whether the Ninth Circuit's judgment should be vacated due to mootness?41
When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudication, the established practice in the federal system is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.42
Yes. Yniguez's changed circumstances, her resignation from public sector employment to pursue work in the private sector, mooted the case stated in her complaint.43 Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through happenstance or the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.44 The exceptional circumstances that abound in this case and the federalism concern lead to the conclusion that vacatur down the line is the equitable solution.45
The Ninth Circuit's judgment should be vacated due to mootness.46