486 U.S. 675 (1988)
On April 16, 1985, respondent was arrested at the scene of a just-completed burglary.1 The arresting officer advised him that he had a constitutional right to remain silent and also the right to have an attorney present during any interrogation.2 Respondent replied that he wanted a lawyer before answering any questions.3 This fact was duly recorded in the officer's written report of the incident.4 In due course, respondent was convicted of the April 16, 1985, burglary.5
On April 19, 1985, while respondent was still in custody pursuant to the arrest three days earlier, a different officer interrogated him about a different burglary that had occurred on April 15.6 That officer was not aware of the fact that respondent had requested the assistance of counsel three days earlier.7 After advising respondent of his rights, the officer obtained an incriminating statement concerning the April 15 burglary.8
In the prosecution for that offense, the trial court suppressed that statement.9 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order in a brief opinion.10 The Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with state court decisions from North Carolina, Virginia, and other jurisdictions that had held Edwards inapplicable to unrelated matters.12
Whether the rule from Edwards v. Arizona that bars further police-initiated interrogation after a suspect requests counsel applies when the later interrogation concerns an unrelated offense?13
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court held that a suspect who has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.14 This bright-line prophylactic rule protects Fifth Amendment rights during custodial interrogation and applies without regard to whether the subsequent interrogation pertains to the same or a different offense.15
Yes. The respondent on April 16, 1985, expressed his desire for counsel by stating he wanted a lawyer before answering any questions during the arrest for the April 16 burglary. This request was recorded in the officer's report. Three days later, while still in custody, a different officer initiated interrogation about the April 15 burglary after giving Miranda warnings and obtained an incriminating statement. Because the respondent had invoked his right to counsel and counsel had not been provided, the Edwards rule barred this police-initiated interrogation even though it concerned an unrelated offense.16 The trial court's suppression of the statement was therefore correct under the rule, as the presumption of involuntariness arising from the invocation persists across separate investigations.17
The fact that the second officer lacked knowledge of the prior request does not alter the analysis, since established procedures must account for such invocations to prevent violations.18 The bright-line nature of the rule ensures clarity for law enforcement and courts alike.19
The Edwards rule applies to bar police-initiated interrogation about an unrelated offense after a suspect has requested counsel.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, dissents from the majority's application of the Edwards rule to unrelated offenses.21 He contends that the majority improperly extends the Edwards rule to separate and independent investigations without sufficient justification.22 Kennedy argues that the prophylactic purpose of Edwards, to prevent badgering by police, is not implicated to the same degree when a new investigation is involved, as the risk of repeated questioning by the same team is low.23
He notes that the suspect receives fresh Miranda warnings and can invoke rights again for the new matter.24 Kennedy emphasizes a more realistic view of human nature, where a suspect may wish to decide whether to speak about the new investigation with counsel once informed of it.25 He concludes that the absolute rule is unnecessary and disrupts legitimate law enforcement efforts, preferring a case-by-case approach to determine voluntariness of waivers.26