481 U.S. 520 (1987)
On November 23, 1982, the Flagstaff Police Department received a telephone call from a local K mart store stating that a man had entered claiming to have killed his son.1 When officers arrived, respondent William Mauro freely admitted that he had killed his son, directed the officers to the child's body, and was arrested.2 He was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene and again after being taken to the police station.3
At the station Mauro told the officers that he did not wish to make any more statements without a lawyer present, and all questioning ceased.4 Because no secure detention area was available, Mauro was held in the office of the police captain.5 At the same time Detective Manson was questioning Mauro's wife in another room.6
After finishing with Manson, Mrs. Mauro asked if she could speak to her husband.7 Manson was reluctant but, after she insisted, discussed the request with Sergeant Allen, who saw no harm in allowing the meeting and suggested that Manson tape-record the conversation while remaining present.8 Manson told both Mr. and Mrs. Mauro that they could speak together only if an officer were present in the room to observe and hear what was going on. He then seated himself at a desk with a tape recorder in plain sight and recorded their brief conversation.9
During the recorded conversation Mrs. Mauro expressed despair about their situation and Mauro told his wife not to answer questions until a lawyer was present.10 At trial on charges of murder and child abuse, where Mauro's defense was insanity, the prosecution played the tape in rebuttal to demonstrate that Mauro was sane.11 Mauro sought suppression of the recording on the ground that it was the product of police interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights.12
The trial court refused to suppress the recording after finding that the officers had yielded to Mrs. Mauro's insistent demands, that the procedure was not a ruse or subterfuge created as an indirect means of avoiding Miranda, and that the officers had legitimate security and safety concerns.13 Mauro was convicted and sentenced to death.14 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether officers interrogated respondent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when they allowed him to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer?17
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.18 In Miranda v. Arizona the Court concluded that in-custody interrogation contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist.19 When an accused has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication with the police.20 Interrogation includes not only express questioning but also its functional equivalent. That is any words or actions on the part of the police other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The focus is primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect rather than the intent of the police.21
No. The officers gave Mauro the warnings required by Miranda.22 Mauro indicated that he did not wish to be questioned further without a lawyer present.23 Mauro never waived his right to have a lawyer present.24 The Court framed the sole remaining question as whether the officers' subsequent actions rose to the level of interrogation.25
The tape recording of the conversation between Mauro and his wife shows that Detective Manson asked Mauro no questions about the crime or his conduct.26 Nor is it suggested that Sergeant Allen's decision to allow Mauro's wife to see him was the kind of psychological ploy that properly could be treated as the functional equivalent of interrogation.27 There is no evidence that the officers sent Mrs. Mauro in to see her husband for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements.28 As the trial court found, the officers tried to discourage her from talking to her husband but finally yielded to her insistent demands.29
Nor was Detective Manson's presence improper.30 His testimony indicated legitimate reasons not related to securing incriminating statements for having a police officer present, including concerns for Mrs. Mauro's safety and security against lying, escape attempts, or smuggling a weapon.31 The weakness of Mauro's claim that he was interrogated is underscored by examining the situation from his perspective.32 A suspect told by officers that his wife will be allowed to speak to him would not feel that he was being coerced to incriminate himself in any way.33
The Arizona Supreme Court was correct to note that there was a possibility that Mauro would incriminate himself while talking to his wife.34 The officers were aware of that possibility when they agreed to allow the Mauros to talk to each other.35 But the actions in this case were far less questionable than the subtle compulsion that the Court held not to be interrogation in Innis.36 Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself.37 Mauro was not subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.38 Thus his volunteered statements cannot properly be considered the result of police interrogation.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Blackmun
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.42 He argued that the Arizona Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the police intended to interrogate respondent.43 The police employed a powerful psychological ploy by failing to give respondent any advance warning that his wife was coming to talk to him, that a police officer would accompany her, or that their conversation would be recorded.44
The police took advantage of Mrs. Mauro's request to visit her husband, setting up a confrontation at a time when he manifestly desired to remain silent.45 Because they allowed the conversation to commence when they knew it was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating statement, the police interrogated him.46 This conclusion is supported by the officers' testimony that they knew incriminating statements were likely to be made.47 Captain Latham's statement indicated that the purpose included seeing what the conversation was about to shed light on the case.48
The Court's opposite conclusion removes an important brick from the wall of protection against police overreaching that surrounds the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects in custody.49