406 U.S. 404 (1972)
Robert Apodaca, Henry Morgan Cooper, Jr., and James Arnold Madden were each convicted in separate trials before Oregon juries of assault with a deadly weapon, burglary in a dwelling, and grand larceny respectively, and in each case the jury returned a less-than-unanimous verdict that satisfied the minimum vote requirements under Oregon law for sustaining a conviction.1 The vote stood at eleven to one in the cases of Apodaca and Madden, while Cooper's jury voted ten to two.2
Following affirmance of the convictions by the Oregon Court of Appeals in a decision reported at 1 Ore. App. 483, 462 P. 2d 691 (1969) and denial of review by the Supreme Court of Oregon, the defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.3 They contended that conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, as established in Duncan v. Louisiana.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 400 U. S. 901 (1970) to consider this claim, which it ultimately found to be without merit.4
Whether conviction of crime by a less-than-unanimous jury violates the right to trial by jury in criminal cases specified by the Sixth Amendment and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment?5
The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal prosecutions.6 The essential function of the jury is to interpose the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen between the accused and the state.7 This function is fulfilled whether the verdict is unanimous or rendered by a substantial majority such as ten to two or eleven to one.
No. The established facts demonstrate that Apodaca, Cooper, and Madden were each convicted by Oregon juries returning less-than-unanimous verdicts that satisfied state law requirements. The rule establishes that unanimity is not essential to the jury's role in preventing governmental oppression.8 A representative group of laymen deliberating freely performs that role equally well when permitted to convict by a ten-to-two or eleven-to-one vote.9 The defendants' interest in receiving the judgment of their peers is therefore equally protected under either voting rule.10
Unanimity is likewise unnecessary to give effect to the reasonable-doubt standard or to ensure that minority viewpoints are heard during deliberations.11
Conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgments of the Oregon Court of Appeals are affirmed.12
Related opinions on this issue
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court squarely held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in a federal criminal case is made wholly applicable to state criminal trials by the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Until today, it had been universally understood that a unanimous verdict is an essential element of a Sixth Amendment jury trial.14 Stewart cited a long line of settled precedents supporting this requirement.15
He would follow those precedents and reverse the judgments before the Court.16