53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528
Carl Anderson worked as an electrician at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard from 1945 to 1976. During that time he worked with and around insulation products containing asbestos that were manufactured and distributed by Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and other companies.1
Anderson was diagnosed in 1981 as suffering from asbestosis and other asbestos-related lung diseases. He and his wife filed this action in 1981 against Owens-Corning and fourteen other defendants. The complaint alleged causes of action for strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties.2
Prior to trial, all defendants except Owens-Corning settled with plaintiffs. At trial, plaintiffs presented evidence that Anderson had been exposed to Owens-Corning's Kaylo asbestos-containing insulation products while working at the shipyard. They presented expert testimony that there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos and that the scientific community knew of the dangers of asbestos as early as the 1930's.3 Owens-Corning presented evidence that it did not know of the dangers of asbestos until the mid-1960's and that it began placing warnings on its products in 1966. It also presented state of the art evidence that the medical and scientific community did not know until the 1960's that there was a significant risk of asbestos-related disease to persons in plaintiff's occupation.4
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Owens-Corning. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the trial court erred in admitting state of the art evidence on the strict liability failure-to-warn claim. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.5 The Supreme Court of California granted review.6
Whether a defendant in a strict products liability action, based upon an alleged failure to warn of a product defect, can present state of the art evidence of the knowledge of the scientific community at the time of manufacture and distribution of the product?7
In strict products liability actions based on failure to warn, a manufacturer is liable only if it failed to warn of a risk that was known or knowable.8 This standard draws on the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution. State of the art evidence is therefore relevant and admissible to show whether the risk was knowable.9
Yes. In strict liability failure-to-warn cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.10 Thus, state of the art evidence is relevant and admissible.11
In this case, Owens-Corning presented state of the art evidence that the medical and scientific community did not know until the 1960's that there was a significant risk of asbestos-related disease to persons in plaintiff's occupation.12 The trial court admitted this evidence, leading to a defense verdict.13 This admission was proper because the rule requires the risk to be known or knowable, making the evidence directly relevant to whether Owens-Corning had a duty to warn at the time of distribution.14
A defendant in a strict products liability failure-to-warn action may present state of the art evidence.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Broussard concurs in the majority opinion but stresses the narrow scope of the holding.16 He emphasizes that state-of-the-art evidence is admissible only when the plaintiff proceeds on an absence-of-warning theory.17 Broussard notes that such evidence would not necessarily be relevant if the plaintiff relies solely on the consumer expectation prong of the design defect standard.18
Under that theory, a manufacturer is strictly liable when a product fails to satisfy ordinary consumer expectations as to safety.19 This recovery occurs without regard to whether the manufacturer knew or could have known of the specific safety problem.20 The approach reflects the warranty heritage of product liability doctrine.21
Justice Mosk concurs in the result but expresses apprehension that the court is retreating from the pure concepts of products liability.22 He contends that the focus in strict liability must remain on the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct.23 Mosk proposes that if the plaintiff establishes actual knowledge by the defendants, state-of-the-art evidence should be irrelevant.24
If only constructive knowledge is shown, then such evidence would be admissible.25 He would draw a clear distinction between actual and constructive knowledge in failure-to-warn cases to preserve the integrity of strict liability principles.26