413 U.S. 266 (1973)
The petitioner, a Mexican citizen holding a valid United States work permit, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California of knowingly receiving, concealing, and facilitating the transportation of approximately 161 pounds of illegally imported marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a.1
United States Border Patrol Officers Shaw and Carrasco stopped the petitioner's car shortly after midnight as it traveled on Highway 78 near Glamis, California, from Calexico toward Blythe.2 The highway at the stop point lies approximately twenty miles north of the Mexican border and was commonly used to evade checkpoints.3 The officers maintained a roving check of vehicles on that road for the specific purpose of checking for aliens.4
The petitioner had come from Mexicali, picked up the car in Calexico, and held a work permit for the United States.5 Officers had been advised by an official bulletin that aliens sometimes concealed themselves by sitting upright behind the back seat rest with legs folded under after springs were removed.6 While looking under the rear seat of the petitioner's car for aliens, the officers discovered packages believed to contain marihuana.7
The petitioner was placed under arrest, advised of his rights, and his car was then searched for additional marihuana, which was found in substantial amounts.8 The motion to suppress was heard on stipulated evidence in the District Court.9
A divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, relying on its prior cases and on § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), which authorizes officers to search any vehicle for aliens within a reasonable distance from any external boundary.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the search.11 He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.12
Whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's automobile by a roving Border Patrol unit without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, conducted on a highway approximately twenty-five air miles north of the Mexican border, violated the Fourth Amendment?13
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of automobiles.14 It requires probable cause for any search away from the border or its functional equivalent.15 Neither the automobile exception from Carroll v. United States nor administrative inspection precedents from Camara v. Municipal Court authorize roving patrols that stop and search vehicles without a warrant, probable cause, or consent.16
Yes. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for searches of automobiles not at the border or its functional equivalent.17 The search here occurred on a roving patrol approximately twenty miles north of the border without any probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or warrant.18 The officers stopped the petitioner's vehicle solely to check for aliens under the authority of the statute and regulation, with no specific information about the car or its occupants.19
This type of unfettered discretion exercised by the Border Patrol matches the evil identified in Camara, where the Court required warrants to limit official discretion in the field.20 The search therefore violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.
The warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurs in the judgment that the search was unconstitutional but writes separately to explore whether area warrants could authorize roving searches on less than traditional probable cause.22 He notes the serious law enforcement problem of illegal alien entry along the border and the practical difficulties of obtaining specific knowledge about particular vehicles.23 Powell concludes that consistent judicial approval, the absence of reasonable alternatives, and the modest intrusion on automobile privacy could support a functional equivalent of probable cause for area warrants, but because no warrant was obtained here the search remains invalid.24
He emphasizes that the judicial function should determine when such warrants issue based on factors like the frequency of illegal traffic and proximity to the border.25
Joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, And Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Justice White dissents, arguing that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant or probable cause.26 He relies on the long-recognized power of the government to protect its borders, the congressional judgment embodied in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), and the practical necessities of enforcing immigration laws along extensive borders.27 White contends that the reasonableness standard is flexible enough to permit random vehicle stops by roving patrols near the border when the highway is known to be used by smugglers.28 He would uphold both the statute and its application in this case.29
He notes that three courts of appeals had consistently sustained such searches and that the majority's rule will hamper effective border enforcement.30
Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) and the accompanying regulation authorizing vehicle searches within one hundred air miles of an external boundary permit searches that satisfy the Fourth Amendment?31
No Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution.32 While statutes should be construed if possible to avoid constitutional conflict, a law purporting to allow warrantless searches without probable cause within a reasonable distance of the border cannot validate searches that fail Fourth Amendment standards.33
No. The statute and regulation purport to authorize searches of vehicles for aliens within one hundred air miles of the border without warrant or probable cause.34 Yet the search of the petitioner's automobile occurred without any individualized suspicion and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment as applied to these facts.35 The Court recognizes the government's power to conduct routine border searches and their functional equivalents but holds that a roving patrol stop twenty miles north of the border on an inland highway falls outside that category.36 Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits the search, the statute cannot save it.37
The statute and regulation do not permit searches that satisfy the Fourth Amendment when conducted without probable cause or a warrant.38