570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013)
In 2004, Allen Alleyne and an accomplice entered a convenience store in Virginia as the manager was closing for the evening.1 They confronted the manager, pointed a gun at his head, demanded the combination to the safe, forced him into the bathroom, bound and gagged him, and removed the safe before fleeing.2
Alleyne was arrested and charged with robbery affecting interstate commerce and using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A).3 The statute sets a five-year mandatory minimum for using or carrying a firearm, which rises to seven years if the firearm is brandished and ten years if discharged.4 At trial the government argued that Alleyne had brandished the firearm, and the jury convicted him on the firearm count but left the verdict form blank on brandishing.5
The presentence report recommended a seven-year sentence on the firearm conviction on the ground that Alleyne had brandished the firearm.6 Alleyne objected that the jury had not found brandishing and that the court could impose only the five-year minimum.7 The district court overruled the objection, found brandishing by a preponderance of the evidence, and imposed the seven-year term.8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether its prior decision in Harris v. United States should be overruled and whether a judge may find facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence.10
Whether this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States should be overruled?11
Any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the offense.12 It must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt under the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause.13 The touchstone is whether the fact exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than authorized by the jury’s verdict.14
Yes. The jury convicted Alleyne of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence but left the verdict form blank on brandishing, authorizing only the five-year minimum under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i).15 The judge then found brandishing by a preponderance and imposed the seven-year minimum under §924(c)(1)(A)(ii).16 This judicial factfinding increased the penalty range and is irreconcilable with Apprendi because it treats facts raising the floor differently from those raising the ceiling, with no basis in history or constitutional principle.17 Harris must therefore be overruled to restore the jury’s role as a check on governmental power.18
The established facts show that Alleyne’s accomplice pointed a gun at the manager’s head and that Alleyne repeated the threat, yet the jury made no finding on brandishing.19 The presentence report and district court then supplied that finding to raise the sentence.20 Because the aggravating fact produced a higher range, it constitutes an element that the jury alone could determine.21
Harris v. United States is overruled because facts increasing mandatory minimums are elements requiring jury findings.22
Related opinions on this issue
I join the Court’s opinion in all but Part III–B.23 I continue to believe that Apprendi was wrongly decided because it fails to recognize the law’s traditional distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing facts.24 Nevertheless, I also believe that Harris was wrongly decided.25
The Apprendi/Harris distinction creates an anomaly in which juries must find facts that permit a higher sentence but not those that require one.26 Because the Court has now overruled Harris, I join its opinion in all but Part III–B to erase that anomaly in our case law.27
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Kagan
I join the opinion of the Court, which persuasively explains why Harris v. United States and McMillan v. Pennsylvania were wrongly decided.28 Under the reasoning of our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, facts that increase the statutory minimum sentence are elements of the offense that must be found by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.29 Although stare decisis is a basic principle, a special justification exists here because procedural rules are at issue and reliance interests are minimal.30
Apprendi has become firmly rooted through subsequent decisions like Booker and Cunningham, making Harris an outlier that must be overruled to bring coherence to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.31
Whether, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, a judge may find facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence a defendant must serve?32
No. The jury’s verdict supported a range of five years to life, but the judge found brandishing by a preponderance and imposed the seven-year minimum.36 This finding altered the legally prescribed range and aggravated the punishment, making brandishing an element that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to determine.37 The fact that the same sentence might have been possible without the finding is irrelevant; the aggravating fact produced a higher range and therefore had to be submitted to the jury.38
The established facts confirm that the verdict form showed only that Alleyne used or carried a firearm, with no brandishing finding.39 The district court and Fourth Circuit nevertheless allowed the judge to supply the missing element.40 Because the mandatory minimum is as relevant to the penalty as the maximum, judicial factfinding here violated the right to a jury trial.41
A judge may not find facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence because such facts are elements reserved for the jury.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Scalia And Kennedy
The Court today overrules Harris v. United States and holds that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.43 I respectfully dissent.44 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial, but it does not require that every fact that affects the sentence be found by a jury.45
This approach is consistent with Apprendi because the jury's verdict authorized the sentence imposed, and the new rule protects judges from legislatures rather than defendants from judges.46 There is no historical support for treating facts affecting only the minimum as elements.47
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts
I join the Chief Justice’s dissent in full.48 I write separately to emphasize two points.49 First, the Court’s decision today is inconsistent with the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment because at the Founding the jury’s role was limited to determining guilt and judges had broad discretion within the statutory range.50
Second, the Court’s decision will have serious practical consequences by requiring juries to make findings on numerous facts traditionally left to judges, leading to longer trials and more appeals.51 The decision also sets a troubling precedent about precedent by overruling well-entrenched decisions without sufficient justification.52