427 U.S. 1
Petitioner Aldinger was hired in 1971 by respondent Howard, the Spokane County treasurer, for clerical work in that office.1
Two months later Howard informed petitioner by letter that although her job performance was excellent, she would be dismissed effective two weeks hence because she was living with her boyfriend.2 Howard's action was taken pursuant to a state statute which provides that the appointing county officer may revoke each appointment at pleasure.3 Though a hearing was requested, none was held before or after the effective date of the discharge.4
Aldinger's action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, as embodied in her second amended complaint, claimed principally under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the discharge violated her substantive constitutional rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and was procedurally defective under the latter's Due Process Clause. An injunction restraining the dismissal and damages for salary loss were sought against Howard, his wife, the named county commissioners, and the county.5
Jurisdiction over the federal claim was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and pendent jurisdiction was alleged to lie over the state law claims against the parties, with the state-law claim against the county resting on state statutes waiving the county's sovereign immunity and providing for vicarious liability arising out of tortious conduct of its officials. There is no diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 among the parties, since all are citizens of the State of Washington.
The District Court dismissed the action as to the county on the ground that since it was not suable as a person under § 1983, there was no independent basis of jurisdiction over the county, and thus the court had no power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the claims against Spokane County.6 From this final judgment under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b), Aldinger appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, applying its prior holdings that pendent jurisdiction was not available to adjudicate state-law claims against a party over which federal jurisdiction was otherwise nonexistent.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits on this question.9
Whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction extends to confer jurisdiction over a party as to whom no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists?10
When Congress has by implication declined to extend federal jurisdiction over a party in the statute conferring jurisdiction over the main federal claim, pendent jurisdiction does not reach a state-law claim against the additional party even if the claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.11
No. Aldinger asserted her federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against county officials but sought to join Spokane County solely on a state-law vicarious liability claim. Counties are excluded from the definition of person under § 1983 as established in Monroe v. Pape and City of Kenosha v. Bruno.12 The jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) therefore does not extend to the county on a pendent state claim because Congress has addressed the party and declined to include it.13 The addition of a completely new party on a state-law claim runs counter to the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress.14
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not extend to confer jurisdiction over a party as to whom no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists in this case.15
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Marshall And Blackmun, Jj.
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the principles of Gibbs should apply equally to pendent state-law claims involving the joinder of additional parties because the Art. III question concerns only subject-matter jurisdiction and not in personam jurisdiction.16 In either case the question of Art. III power concerns whether the claims asserted are such as would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.17
He maintained that the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment shows opponents recognized the difference between imposing federal liability on municipalities and entertaining state-law claims against them in federal court.18 The opponents consistently expressed their views that federal courts could entertain state-law claims against local governmental units under ordinary jurisdictional restrictions.19
Brennan concluded that the majority's per se rule undermines the congressional policy favoring federal forums for § 1983 claims by forcing litigants into duplicative litigation and disregarding the duty to respect a suitor's choice of a federal forum for federal constitutional claims.20