490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989)
In 1985, an Alabama grand jury indicted James Lewis Smith for burglary, rape, and sodomy arising from a single assault.1 Smith agreed to plead guilty to burglary and rape in exchange for dismissal of the sodomy charge.2 The trial court accepted the plea, dismissed the sodomy charge, and sentenced Smith to concurrent thirty-year terms on the burglary and rape convictions.3
Smith later moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that it had not been entered knowingly and voluntarily.4 The trial court denied the motion, but the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that Smith had not been properly informed of the penalties for the crimes.5 The case was reassigned to the same trial judge, the State reinstated the sodomy charge, and Smith proceeded to trial on all three charges.6
At trial, the victim testified that Smith had broken into her home at night wearing only underwear and a ski mask, held a kitchen knife to her chest, raped and sodomized her repeatedly, and forced her to engage in oral sex, with the attack lasting over an hour in the bedroom across from where her three young children slept.7 The State introduced Smith's post-arrest statement admitting many details.8 Smith testified that he had been in bed with his girlfriend at the time.9 The jury convicted Smith on all three counts.10
The trial judge imposed a life sentence for burglary, a concurrent life sentence for sodomy, and a consecutive 150-year sentence for rape.11 The judge explained that the harsher sentence was based on evidence presented at trial, including the victim's testimony about the repeated rapes and threats, of which the court had been unaware at the time of the guilty plea sentencing.12
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the life sentences for burglary and sodomy but remanded the rape conviction for resentencing.13 The Alabama Supreme Court granted review of the burglary sentence and reversed it.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether a presumption of vindictiveness arises when a sentence imposed after trial is greater than a sentence previously imposed after a guilty plea?16
The Pearce presumption of vindictiveness applies only when there is a reasonable likelihood that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.17 When the first sentence is imposed after a guilty plea and the second after a trial, the presumption does not arise because the judge typically has considerably less information after the plea than after a full trial.18
No. Applying the rule to the facts of this case, Smith initially received concurrent thirty-year sentences after his guilty plea.19 After successfully challenging the plea and proceeding to trial, he was convicted on all counts and received life sentences for burglary and sodomy and a consecutive 150-year sentence for rape.20 The trial judge based the increased sentence on new information from the trial, such as the victim's detailed testimony about the prolonged attack and its circumstances, which was not available at the time of the plea sentencing.21 This additional information and the absence of plea bargaining considerations mean there is no reasonable likelihood that the increase was due to vindictiveness.22
No presumption of vindictiveness arises when a sentence imposed after trial is greater than a sentence previously imposed after a guilty plea.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented, adhering to his longstanding position that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits any increase in sentence upon reconviction following a successful challenge to a guilty plea.24 He quoted his earlier concurrence in North Carolina v. Pearce to emphasize that the second penalty cannot exceed the first if respect is to be had for the guarantee against double jeopardy.25
Whether the companion case Simpson v. Rice in North Carolina v. Pearce should be overruled to the extent it applied a presumption of vindictiveness to an increased sentence following trial after vacation of a guilty plea?26
Yes. The Court concluded that Simpson v. Rice did not consider the distinction between the Pearce case and the Rice case.29 Subsequent developments in the constitutional law relating to guilty pleas support a different result.30 A guilty plea may justify leniency, and a trial generally affords more sentencing information than a plea.31
Therefore, there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness where a second sentence imposed after a trial is heavier than a first sentence imposed after a guilty plea.32
Simpson v. Rice is overruled to the extent it applied the presumption in this context.33