535 U.S. 654 (2002)
LeReed Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault, a class A misdemeanor carrying a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment and a $2,000 fine, after representing himself at a bench trial in the District Court of Etowah County, Alabama.1 He invoked his right to a new trial before a jury in Circuit Court, where he again appeared without a lawyer and was convicted.2
The Circuit Court sentenced Shelton to serve 30 days in the county prison.3 As authorized by Alabama law, the court suspended that sentence and placed Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation, conditioned on his payment of court costs, a $500 fine, reparations of $25, and restitution in the amount of $516.69.4
Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds.5 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals initially held that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended prison sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and remanded for a determination whether Shelton had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right.6 When the case returned from remand, the appeals court reversed course and affirmed the conviction because Shelton remained on probation.7 The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals in relevant part.8 It affirmed Shelton's conviction and the monetary portion of his punishment but invalidated the aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of suspended jail time.9
Courts have divided on the Sixth Amendment question presented in this case.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.11
Whether the Sixth Amendment prohibits a court from imposing a suspended sentence that may result in the defendant’s incarceration if he violates the terms of probation, when the defendant has not been provided counsel?12
The Sixth Amendment requires that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.13 This rule applies to any sentence that exposes the defendant to a term of incarceration, including a suspended sentence with probation conditions that may lead to activation of the prison term.14
Yes. LeReed Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault after representing himself at trial without appointed counsel.15 He received a 30-day suspended jail sentence plus two years of unsupervised probation conditioned on payment of a $500 fine, restitution, and costs.16 The suspended sentence constitutes a term of imprisonment that was imposed for the offense of conviction.17
It may result in actual incarceration upon violation of probation terms.18 This directly triggers the requirement of counsel under the actual-imprisonment standard because the conviction would then result in imprisonment for the underlying offense rather than for a separate probation violation.19
The Sixth Amendment prohibits a court from imposing a suspended sentence that may result in the defendant’s incarceration if he violates the terms of probation when the defendant has not been provided counsel.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only upon actual imprisonment and not upon the mere threat of future incarceration through a suspended sentence.21 He maintained that the majority improperly extended Argersinger and Scott by invalidating the suspended sentence before any deprivation of liberty occurred.22 The decision would impose substantial new costs on the states by requiring counsel in every case where a suspended sentence is possible.23
Any constitutional question about procedures at probation revocation could be addressed only if and when the state actually sought to activate the sentence.24